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NOTES
EMPOWERING CHILDREN: GRANTING FOSTER
CHILDREN THE RIGHT TO INITIATE PARENTAL
RIGHTS TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
The status of a foster child, particularly for the foster child, is a
strange one. He's part of no-man's land.... The child knows in-
stinctively that there is nothing permanent about the setup, and he
is, so to speak, on loan to the family he is residing with. If it doesn't
work out, he can be swooped up and put in another home. It's
pretty hard to ask a child or foster parent to make a large emotional
commitment under these conditions ....
-Art Buchwald
INTRODUCTION
In 1636, less than thirty years after the founding of Jamestown
Colony, seven-year-old Benjamin Eaton became America's first foster
child.2 Over 350 years later, significant numbers of American chil-
dren continue to require foster care. At present, over 500,000 chil-
dren around the United States receive out-of-home care;3 of these,
approximately 429,000 are recipients of foster family care.4 Studies
predict that because of deteriorating economic conditions,5 an in-
1 Joseph Goldstein, Finding the Least Detrimental Alternative: The Problem for the Law of
Child Placement, in PARENTS OF CHILDREN IN PLACEMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PROGRAMS 188,
n.9 (Paula A. Sinanoglu & Anthony N. Maluccio eds., 1981) (quoting speech given by Art
Buchwald in celebration of 150th Anniversary of the Jewish Child Care Association, April
1972).
2 NATIONAL ACTION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN: A SURVEY OF AcTIvITIES BASED ON REPORTS
SUBMITTED BY STATES AND COMMITTEES, NOVEMBER 1974-DECEMBER 1975, at 121, 122 (1975)
(statement of David T. Evans, President, National Foster Parent Association, Before the
Senate Subcommittee on Children and Youth and the House Select Subcommittee on Ed-
ucation on December 1, 1975).
3 HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YoUTH & FAMILIES, No PLACE TO CALL HOME:
DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) [herein-
after DISCARDED CHILDREN]. Out-of-home placement figures include children in the foster
care system, in the juvenile justice system, and in the mental health system. Id. at 14-15.
4 This figure reflects a 53% increase since 1986. Warren Cohen et al., The Year That
14Was: 1992, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 4, 1993, at 96, 104.
5 Joan H. Hollinger & Alice Bussiere, The Child's Rights in Adoption and Foster Care in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED
WITH UNITED STATES LAW 259, 276 (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990)
[hereinafter CHILDREN'S RIGHTS]; see also U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT,
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
17 (1990) [hereinafter CRITICAL FIRST STEPS] (noting that "the evidence is strong that pov-
erty makes child maltreatment much more likely.... [C]hild maltreatment [is] seven times
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Children who remain adrift in foster care for long periods often
suffer severe emotional trauma.16 Moving from place to place without
the chance to experience stable care from any adult, such children
may experience frequent bouts of insecurity and loneliness. 17 Even
when children remain in the same foster home for many years, many
still regard it as a temporary arrangement 8 and are apt to define their
foster homes as "part-time home[s]"19 where they feel "a bit
uncertain."20
Methods of coping with the unstable world of foster care vary
considerably. For example, while growing up as a foster child in Hol-
lis, Long Island, humorist Art Buchwald "survived" by becoming the
class clown and inventing elaborate fantasies.21 Other children, how-
ever, exhibit extreme responses to foster care. They may succumb to
violence, promiscuity, depression and defiance in an effort to deal
with the fear and confusion that they experience as foster children.22
During the summer of 1992, a twelve-year-old boy named Gregory
Kingsley exhibited a unique response to his "limbo" status in the Flor-
ida foster care system: legal self-help. Claiming he just wanted "a
place to be,"23 Gregory filed a complaint with a Florida circuit court
seeking to terminate relations with his natural parents and facilitate
adoption by his foster parents. Headlines proclaimed "Boy Wants Di-
vorce from Parents [! ],"24 television movie deals were negotiated, 25 and
16 JOSEPH E. PEsico, NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS, WHO
KNows? WHO CARES? FORGOTTEN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 9 (1979) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL COMM'N REPORT]. The National Commission Report concluded that the effect of
impermanence upon foster children was "devastating," and caused them great pain, frus-
tration, and fear. Id. Testifying before the Commission, one child revealed: "[t]he thing
that hurt the most was that foster care made me nobody's child." Id.
17 Id.
18 Malcolm Hill &John Triseliotis, The Transition from Long Term Care to Adoption, in
THE STATE AS PARENT: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTIONS WITH
YOUNG PERSONS 420 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galway eds., 1989).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 For example, Mr. Buchwald fantasized that he was really the son of a Rothschild,
kidnapped by gypsies when he was six months old, and sold to a couple on their way to
America. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 188 n.9. Buchwald also dreamt that the Rothschilds
had hired France's foremost detective to find him and that it was only a matter of time
before he would be rescued from his foster home. Id.
22 Almeda R.Jolowicz, A Foster Child Needs His Own Parents, in PARENTS OF CHILDREN IN
PLACEMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PROGRAMS, supra note 1, at 55-56.
23 First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregory Kingsley (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992)
(No. JU90-5245), rev'd sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
24 See, e.g., Christina Cheakalos, 11-year-old Florida Boy Sues Parents for Divorce, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., June 7, 1992, at Al.
25 The ABC television network aired a movie about the Gregory Kingsley case on Feb-
ruary 8, 1993.
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the American public was mesmerized.2 6 Many reporters and commen-
tators misconstrued Gregory's case, characterizing it as a child "divorc-
ing" his parents and heralding it as a novel legal event indicating the
decline of the traditional American family.27 Still others hailed him as
the "Rosa Parks of the movement to expand the rights of children
against the traditional prerogatives of biological parents."28
Apart from providing fodder for the family values debate that
raged during the 1992 presidential campaign,29 Gregory's case dem-
onstrates the importance of granting children the right to have their
voices heard in courtrooms. Foster children need to be given direct
access to the judicial system so that they can adequately protect their
rights and address their needs-something that the foster care system
has consistently failed to do.30 Indeed, Gregory's plight provides a
good example of the foster care system's failure to properly address
the needs of the children under its care. Had it had not been for
Gregory's own efforts, the court probably never would have known of
his desires, his problems, or his needs.3'
This Note argues that foster children should be granted the right
to initiate termination proceedings, and hence the opportunity to
make out a prima facie case for severing the rights of their natural
parents when those responsible for their welfare fail to do so. To sup-
26 Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents
Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1836 (1993). Despite the fact that numerous research studies
and reports have catalogued the serious faults of the United States foster care system since
the 1950s, Gregory's lawsuit exposed many Americans to these problems for the first time.
Additionally, with the media hailing him for his heroism and courage, Gregory became a
symbol for all in a year in which the overriding theme was "taking responsibility for your
own future." Sonya Live (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 31, 1992) available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, transcript no. 208. People Magazine even named Gregory one of the "25
Most Intriguing People of 1992." The 25 Most Intriguing People of 1992: Gregoly K, PEoPLE,
Dec. 28, 1992-Jan. 4, 1993, at 65 [hereinafter Intriguing People].
27 Woodhouse, supra note 26, at 1836-37 (noting that the "media misconstrued a rela-
tively ordinary case ... as a pathbreaking legal event"); see A Boy's Divorce is Upheld in Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A21 (calling this "the case of Gregory K, the boy who 'di-
vorced' his mother"); see also Anthony DePalma, Mother Denies Abuse of Son Suing to End
Parental Tie, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 1992, at A20 (stating that the "trial ... could substantially
alter the legal rights of children and broaden the debate over the structure of contempo-
rary American families").
28 Andrew L. Shapiro, Children in Court-The New Crusade, THE NATION, Sept. 27,
1993, at 301.
29 At the 1992 Republican Convention, speaker Patrick Buchanan cited cases like
Gregory's as examples of Democratic Party support for the right of children to sue their
parents, which, he argued, would undermine the traditional family. See DePalma, supra
note 27, at A20; see also Shapiro, supra note 28, at 317 (quoting Professor Martha Fineman
as saying "[t]here are many conservative and reactionary uses of children's rights"). Ironi-
cally, Gregory's main purpose in filing a termination petition was to provide himself with a
"traditional" family of his own. See Woodhouse, supra note 26, at 1837.
30 See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the foster care
system's failure in Gregory's case.
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port the argument that such new rights are necessary, Section I of this
Note briefly explores the current foster care crisis in America.3 2 Sec-
tion I focuses on the plight of foster children who are unable to re-
turn to their unfit natural parents but are denied adoption because
legal ties to their natural parents remain unsevered. Section II of this
Note surveys the debate over children's rights, focusing on various ar-
guments for and against granting foster children the right to initiate
termination proceedings,3 3 and concludes that this right must be
granted. Granting foster children the right to initiate parental rights
termination proceedings will enable them to help themselves to a bet-
ter life, complete with loving and permanent adoptive parents. Sec-
tion III of this Note surveys the legal status of American foster
children and proposes several arguments in support of guaranteeing
foster children the right to initiate termination proceedings.3 4 Fi-
nally, Section IV demonstrates the important role that effective coun-
sel can play in the success of termination proceedings and argues that
the right to initiate termination proceedings is meaningless unless fos-
ter children are also guaranteed the right to counsel.3 5
I
FOSTER CARE IN AMERICA: A NATIONAL CRISIS
3 6
A. Children, Foster Care & the Law
Although both children and adults legally may be considered
United States citizens, children possess far fewer rights than their
adult counterparts. Commentators frequently cite the special needs
of children as a basis for limiting children's rights.3 7 Ironically, how-
ever, in limiting children's rights, and entrusting what limited legal
rights they do possess to understaffed and underfunded institutional
decisionmakers, society has placed children in a state of legal limbo
from which it is often difficult to escape.
The legal rights of children in this country have developed slowly.
Early American courts adopted the English common law view that
children possessed virtually no legal rights and were comparable to
chattel or prized possessions of their fathers.38 The idea that children
32 See infra notes 36-151 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 152-215 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 216-380 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 381-432 and accompanying text.
36 Numerous commentators have described the state of the U.S. child welfare system
as one of"crisis." See, e.g., CHILDREN'S RIrHTs IN AMERICA 276 (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard
A. Davidson eds., 1990); CRITICAL FiRsr STEPS, supra note 5.
37 Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. EDUC. REv. 487, 488 (1973).
38 Florence Kelley, On Some Changes in the Legal Status of the Child Since Blackstone, INT'L
Rv., August 1882, reprinted in THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 83, 85 (Robert H. Bremner
ed., 1974). Conversely, mothers were not entitled to any legal power over their children.
1204 [Vol. 79:1200
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had rights was considered "revolutionary,"39 and it was not until this
century that special legal rights for children emerged.40 Although
modem courts gradually have enlarged the legal privileges of chil-
dren,4 ' historically, federal and state judges sought to avoid situations
involving intervention in day-to-day family life.42 In fact, the applica-
tion of constitutional jurisprudence to legal battles involving children
and families is a relatively recent development.43 The Supreme Court
has developed a body of constitutional law that touches on children's
rights. For example, the Court has recognized Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process rights for juveniles in judicial proceedings, 44 as well
as First Amendment rights for children who donned black armbands
in protest of the Vietnam War 45 and children who refused to salute
the flag in public school for religious reasons.4 6 The Court also has
held that a state cannot place undue procedural burdens on a minor's
ability to exercise her constitutional rights.47
Beyond these narrow constitutional holdings, however, the law's
concern for children is generally limited to juvenile delinquency hear-
ings and cases in which the state seeks to limit parental rights, particu-
larly in cases involving abuse, neglect or the transfer of custody.48
During the last two decades, however, courts have become increas-
According to Florence Kelley, "[s]o absolute was the paternal possession that... the father
could give or bequeath away his child's custody despite its mother, though it were an infant
in arms, or even before its birth." Id. Indeed, the state would only intervene in family
matters involving extreme violence by the parents against their children. NoAH WEINSTEIN,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1 (1974).
39 Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAvis L. Rv.
255, 256 (1979).
40 Robert M. Horowitz, Children's Rights: A Look Backward and a Glance Ahead in LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 4 (Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1984).
41 Rodham, supra note 37, at 489.
42 See Lisa A. Richette, Children and the Future, in EMERGING RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: How
FAR SHOULD WE Go? 46, 51 (U. Va. Conference 1976) [hereinafter EMERGING RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN] ("Judges tread uneasily on ... terrains involving children, foster parents, and
social workers. Solutions are better reached outside the judicial arena .... ."); WALTER
WADLINGTON ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 48 (1983) (noting that, with the excep-
tion of divorce cases, courts are reluctant to interfere).
43 WADLINGTON ET AL., supra note 42, at 48.
44 See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that ajuvenile was entitled to proce-
dural safeguards contained in the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(extending those adult procedural protections guaranteed in criminal trials to children
involved in delinquency proceedings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (requir-
ing that a waiver from juvenile court to adult court meet certain minimum due process
requirements); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (recognizing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right of a fifteen-year-old child to be protected against coerced confessions).
45 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("Students in school as
well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution ... possessed of fundamental
rights which the state must respect .... .").
46 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
47 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
48 Rodham, supra note 37, at 490.
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ingly concerned with defining the fights of foster children, as well as
those of state officials and parents who participate in foster care pro-
grams.49 Yet, despite this increase in litigation and judicial concern,
foster children still have neither a recognized right nor the means
to take legal action against a destructive or non-existent family
relationship.
B. A Nation of Children in Limbo
1. Welfare Systems in Crisis
The objective of foster care is to provide temporary care for ne-
glected children and to eventually reunite them with their natural par-
ents,50 yet numerous studies indicate that many of our nation's foster
care systems fail to accomplish these goals.5 ' The primary problem
with modern foster care systems is that they must deal with an enor-
mous number of displaced children, most of whom are from low-in-
come or minority families.5 2 For example, in our nation's capital,
49 The increase in foster care litigation is due, in part, to the myriad of problems that
have gripped state agencies across the country. See infra part I.B.
50 The Supreme Court defines foster care as a "child welfare service which provides
substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his own family cannot care for
him for a temporary or extended period, and when adoption is neither desirable nor possi-
ble." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 823
(1977) [hereinafter Smith v. OFFER] (emphasis added) (quoting CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE
OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAMILY CARE SERVICE 5 (1959)). The Court also enu-
merated the following distinctive features of foster care: "[I]t is care in a family, it is nonin-
stitutional substitute care, . . . [and] it is for a planned period-either temporary or
extended." Id. at 824 (quoting ALFRED KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 355 (1967)).
The Court concluded that "unlike adoptive placement... [foster care does not] impl[y] a
permanent substitution of one home for another." Id. (quoting KADUSHIN, supra, at 355).
51 See, e.g., LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY 54-64 (1989); Evans, supra note
2, at 122; KNITZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 24; ALAN R. GRUBER, CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CASE: DESTrrUTE, NEGLECTED, BETRAYED 15 (1978).
52 A study conducted by the Children's Defense Fund revealed that "children whose
families are in poverty are more likely to be at risk of foster care placement, as a result of
both the financial and psychological stresses poverty imposes." KNrrZER & ALLEN, supra
note 13, at 49 n.57. The study also found that "minority families are disproportionately
poor," and as a result, minority children are also over-represented in foster care programs.
Id. at 49. The Supreme Court also noted the prevalence of minority children in the foster
care system:
It is certainly true that the poor resort to foster care more often than other
citizens. For example, over 50% of all children in foster care in New York
City are from female-headed families receiving Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children .... Minority families are also more likely to turn to foster
care; 52.3% of the children in foster care in New York City are black and
25.5% are Puerto Rican.... This disproportionate resort to foster care by
the poor and victims of discrimination doubtless reflects in part the greater
likelihood of disruption of poverty-stricken families .... The poor have
little choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when family crises
strike.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 833-34 (citations omitted). See also ShirleyJenkins, Child Welfare as a Class
System, in CHILDREN AND DECENT PEOPLE 3, 11-12 (Alvin L. Schorr ed., 1974) (citing several
1206 [Vol. 79:1200
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some social workers are responsible for as many as one hundred chil-
dren, a figure significantly in excess of a court-approved ratio of
twelve to twenty cases per worker.53 A recent study determined that
some Washington, D.C. social workers were so overwhelmed by their
caseloads that they failed to investigate cases for extended periods and
removed children from their homes without making reasonable ef-
forts to provide the families with services that would preclude removal
actions.54
The length of time spent in foster care is also increasing for most
children.55 In Texas, for example, forty-four percent of nearly 8000
foster children remain in foster care eighteen months longer than rec-
ommended.56 The Texas welfare system is also flawed in that it
removes foster children from homes and replaces them again an aver-
age of four times per year, a practice that fails to provide a stable envi-
ronment for those receiving foster care.57
Even in Arkansas, where "child advocate" President Bill Clinton
served as governor for five terms, the child welfare system is in a "state
of emergency."58 In 1991 a class action suit was filed on behalf of
1536 Arkansas foster children seeking to reform the state welfare sys-
tem.59 The complaint alleged that "[a] bused and neglected children
... [were] removed from their homes and placed voluntarily in unli-
censed homes," only to be subsequently "abandoned" by the Arkansas
child welfare program. 60 The suit resulted in a consent decree signed
by Clinton that acknowledged professional and medial neglect and
provided $15 million worth of emergency reform.61
studies which show that disadvantaged families more often had children placed in foster
homes); Martin Rein et al., Foster Family Care: Myth and Reality, in CHILDREN AND DECENT
PEOPLE 24, 25-29 (discussing foster care as a class-bound system).
53 Marcia S. Greene, D.C. Hires 94 Social Workers As Child Welfare Load Rises, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 1992, at D3 (discussing how Washington, D.C. recently added new social
workers in an attempt to improve these ratios).
54 Id.
55 See DISCARDED CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 18 ("There is... evidence emerging from
state and local studies indicating that the median length of stay of children in the child
welfare system is on the rise again.").
56 Deborah Tedford, Texas Children Often Languish in Foster Care; Study Reveals Flaw in
System, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 27, 1992, at Al (children remain more than two years; six
months is recommended).
57 Such stability and continuity is considered by many child experts to be a critical
element of a child's healthy development. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
58 George Archibald, Class-Action Suit Forced Reforms in Foster Care Program, WASH.
TIMEs, July 26, 1992, at A6.
59 Id. (discussing Angela R. v. Clinton, an unpublished opinion). The consent order
approved in the case was subsequently vacated. See Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320 (8th
Cir. 1993).
60 Archibald, supra note 58.
61 Id.
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2. Examining Permanency Planning
Research studies dating as far back as 1959 expose serious flaws in
the foster care system.62 The tenacity of these problems suggests an
urgent need to reexamine the practices that were developed to pro-
tect American children. Perhaps the most significant of these prac-
tices is permanency planning, a scheme developed in the 1970s by
child advocates who sought to address some of the system's most seri-
ous problems.6 3 Under permanency planning, child welfare authori-
ties attempt to place each child in a permanent family and home.6 4
As a matter of priority, the authorities try to return children already in
foster care to their natural parents. In cases where such a reunion
cannot be effected, permanency planning seeks to free children for
adoption.65
Freeing a foster child for adoption requires either that the natu-
ral parents voluntarily relinquish the child or that a court of law for-
mally terminate parental rights. Although termination proceedings
vary byjurisdiction, all states require separate hearings based on a spe-
cial petition or motion, usually filed by a child's court-appointed attor-
ney or a case worker on behalf of the state and the foster child.66
62 See PELTON, supra note 51, at 53-54; see also DAVID FANSHEL & EUGENE B. SHINN,
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A LONGITUDINAL INVESTIGATION (1978) (detailing the only lon-
gitudinal study of foster children ever taken); GRUBER, supra note 51; MAAS & ENGLER,
supra note 13 (discussing "children in limbo"); ANN W. SHYNE & ANITA G. SCHROEDER,
NATIONAL STUDY OF SOCIAL SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (1978) (detailing a
survey of public social services to children and their families); Henry S. Maas, Children in
Long-Term Foster Care, 48 CHILD WELFARE 321 (1969) (reporting a study on the lives of chil-
dren in foster care for 10 or more years); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status
of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976)
(discussing the inadequacies of laws regarding the removal of children and proposing new
standards for removal determination).
63 It is broadly accepted in the fields of child development and psychology that chil-
dren need to be raised in a permanent family setting in order to be emotionally healthy.
See Mark A. Hardin & Ann Shalleck, Children Living Apart from Their Parents, in LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 40, at 371-73; see also PELTON, supra note 51, at 54. A 1987
report indicates that programs designed to promote permanency planning have been im-
plemented by at least 25 states including the following: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
64 Hardin & Shalleck, supra note 63, at 371.
65 It is widely accepted that temporary foster care placements, even if they are long-
term placements, do not provide children with the permanence that they require. See Har-
din & Shalleck, supra note 63, at 371-73; see also PELTON, supra note 51, at 54 (discussing
permanency planning as a response to professional criticism of the foster care system).
66 Most jurisdictions recognize parental abandonment, neglect or abuse of the child,
or mental deficiency of the parent, as grounds for involuntary termination. See COMMrIrEE
ON THE OFFICE OF THE ATr'y GEN., NATIONAL ASS'N OF Arr'Ys GEN., LEGAL ISSUES IN FOSTER
CARE 5-6 (1976) [hereinafter LEGAL ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE); Vincent De Francis, Termina-
1208 [Vol. 79:1200
NOTE-EMPOWERING CHILDREN
Successful termination proceedings sever all remaining legal ties
between the natural parent and the child, completely abolishing pa-
rental rights to receive information about the child or to communi-
cate with her.67 Although drastic, termination constitutes a necessary
step toward adoption for foster children who are unable to return to
the home of their unfit parents.
For these foster children, termination provides the hope that
their "critical, formative years [will not be spent] adrift in foster care,
needlessly deprived of the adoption that would give permanence to
their lives." 68 Studies by child experts conclude that "children need to
feel wanted and accepted[:] ... they need continuity in their relation-
ships with biological or psychological parents; they need guidance to
cope with the demands of growing up; and they need to have some
sense that there is a regular, dependable quality to the world. ' 69 But
children who are frequently shuffled between foster homes never ex-
perience the stable family environment so vital to their healthy devel-
opment.'0 Child advocates contend that impermanence devastates
the lives of foster children, causing them great pain, frustration and
anxiety.7' Indeed, studies have shown that long-term placement in
foster care, where acceptance, continuity and regularity are not read-
ily found, can severely retard a child's development.7 2 Thus, when all
reasonable efforts to return children to their families have failed, it
tion of Parental Rights-Balancing the Equities, in LEGAL RiGHTs OF CHILDREN 98, 106-11
(1973).
67 De Francis, supra note 66, at 99-101. Termination also rescinds the parents' duty to
support the child. Id.
68 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 10. The Commission noted:
A [1977] study by the New York City Comptroller's office revealed that 97
per cent of the children in foster care were there because of parental abuse,
neglect, "inability to cope," illness and other reasons not the fault of the
child. Far less often the child was in foster care for being incorrigible at
home or for having a physical or emotional handicap which parents could
not handle.
Id. at 9.
69 KNITZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 1; see also ADVIsORY COMM'N ON CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT, TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY FOR CHILDREN AND FAMIIES (1976); JOINT COMM'N ON
MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN, CRISIS IN CHILD MENTAL HEALTH: CHALLENGE FOR THE
1970's (1969); ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTr. YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
70 Janeen Shannon, Foster Care Practicalities, in EMERGING RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra
note 42, at 13 (describing the gap between ideal foster care and the reality of foster care).
71 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
72 See, e.g., KNITZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 40-42;Jolowicz, supra note 22, at 55; see
also Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980's: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the Warren
Years, 20 FAM. L.Q. 255, 257 (1986) (contending that foster care systems are often responsi-
ble for "destroying salvageable human beings and producing yet another generation of the
economically dependent and socially and psychologically unfit... [who will] fill our mental
hospitals, our jails and our welfare rolls"); John J. Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Fed-
eral Statutory Reform and the Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 633, 638 n.8 (1981)
(noting that "[t]he effects of foster care on children can be devastating").
1994] 1209
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will generally serve the child's best interests73 to terminate parental
rights and free him for adoption, rather than to allow him to languish
in long-term foster care.
Although such determinations may seem easy, identifying the
"best interests of the child" has actually proven difficult for judges and
caseworkers. Courts have failed to devise a uniform standard to guide
their placement decisions; therefore, decisionmaking proceeds on an
ad hoc basis. Additionally, battles waged between natural parents, fos-
ter parents, and state agencies often distract participants from the pri-
mary reason for the termination proceeding: concern for the health
and happiness of the foster child.7 4 Permanency planning guidelines
were developed to improve the quality of decisionmaking in termina-
tion proceedings by helping foster care officials and judges under-
stand and address the complex issues that arise in termination cases.
In 1975 a Children's Defense Fund (CDF) study recommended the
implementation of a three-step process to ensure the availability of
permanent homes for those foster children who are unable to return
to their natural parents:
(1) timely identification of the children by workers or as a result of
independent periodic review procedures;
(2) timely initiation of proceedings to determine if legal severing of
the rights of the natural parent is appropriate, either by voluntary
relinquishment of the child or by court ordered termination; and
(3) timely adoption of the child by a new parent or parents. 75
73 The obligation of the state when acting in its parens patriae capacity is to require the
courts to do "what is best for the interest of the child." See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E.
624, 626 (N.Y. 1925). The decisionmaker is required to take the perspective "of a 'wise,
affectionate, and careful parent' and make provision for the child accordingly." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). See also Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) (introducing the notion of
the child's interest). Thus, "placement decisions should reflect what is in the best interest
of the child." ROBERTA GoTrESMAN, THE CHILD AND THE LAw 113 (1981).
Although no uniform standard for determining the best interests of the child has
been formulated, courts tend to presume incorrectly that the best interests of the child are
served by being with the natural parents in the absence of unusual or countervailing cir-
cumstances. See LEGAL ISSUES IN FOSTER CARE, supra note 66, at 19 (noting that courts have
been criticized for utilizing the indefinite "best interests" standard in a manner that fo-
cuses exclusively on a child's physical well being, while failing to understand or acknowl-
edge " 'the necessity of safeguarding a child's psychological well being' "); see alsoJOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 6 n.4 (1979) (recommending
that courts seek the "least detrimental alternative" for each child, which is defined as the
specific placement that will allow each child to experience a continuous relationship with
"at least one adult who is or will become his psychological parent"). Despite the lack of
consensus over the precise content that should be attributed to the "best interests" stan-
dard, the "phrase has rightfully retained its place in American law as an expression of the
need to keep the interests and perspective of the child foremost in the minds of adult
decisionmakers."Jane Ellis, The Best Interests of the Child, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA,
supra note 5, at 3, 4.
74 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 7.
75 KNrZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 26.
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The CDF study also suggests several factors for judges to consider dur-
ing termination proceedings (step (2)):
-The length of time the child has been out of the home
-The strength of the child's past relationship with the natural parent
-The child's response to current visits and trial stays at home
-The strength of the child's psychological relationship with foster
parent(s) if such a relationship has been formed
-The child's wishes, depending on his age76
Permanency planning advocates hoped that such recommenda-
tions and guidelines would facilitate the adoption of permanency
planning throughout the nation.
3. The Limited Success of Permanency Planning
Although many states have implemented permanency planning
standards and guidelines over the past twenty years, the permanency
planning movement has enjoyed only limited success in achieving its
goals.77 Some child welfare experts have conducted surveys that indi-
cate a marked decrease in long-term foster care. For example, the
1975 CDF survey, which was distributed to 140 county welfare agencies
across the country, reported that twenty percent of the foster children
residing in those counties had been in foster care for over six years.78
Twelve years later, a study of child welfare programs in twenty-seven
states indicated that permanency planning had improved the situa-
tion: only ten percent of all foster children remained in foster care
for six years or more.79
Other experts, however, have compiled less favorable survey re-
sults. A 1978 study of New York children placed in foster care for
longer than ninety days found that fifty percent of the two-year-old
children, and forty-seven percent of the African American children,
remained in foster care five years later.80 A 1980 survey revealed no
significant improvements: the average length of stay in New York fos-
ter care was 4.4 years,8 ' and fifty-seven percent of all foster children
had been in the system for over two years.8 2 Gregory Kingsley's home
state of Florida has also failed to reap the expected benefits of perma-
nency planning. A 1979 study found that Florida's foster children
76 Id. at 30.
77 DISCARDED CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 1-2.
78 KNrrZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 3-4, 25. Id. at 26 n.45. A national study con-
ducted in 1977 produced similar results: Approximately 23% of children in foster care
remained there for at least six years. See SHONE & SCHROEDER, SUpra note 62, at 119-20.
79 PELTON, supra note 51, at 55 (citing a 1937 study based on data from 27 states).
80 Id. at 54-55.
81 Id. at 55.
82 Id.
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spent an average of thirty-four months in foster care.83 Fourteen years
later, child advocates in Florida can argue that no significant improve-
ments have been made because approximately two-thirds of the state's
foster children still remain in foster care beyond the eighteen months
permitted by law.
The limited success of permanency planning8 4 can be explained,
in part, by a contradiction which lies at the heart of the foster care
problem. The underlying principle of permanency planning is that a
child's right to a permanent, stable home should take precedence
over the rights of neglectful or incompetent parents. In practice,
however, permanency planning systems succumb to societal pressure
to protect the rights of natural parents, even at the expense of the
child. As a society, we hold fast to the belief that the best place for
children is with their natural parents.8 5 Consequently, judges and so-
cial service agents are reluctant to terminate parental rights even
when faced with lengthy histories of severe child abuse and neglect.8 6
The decision to terminate a parent's rights has been described as
"one of the most painful a judge makes."87 Judges must predict
whether termination will be in a child's long-term best interests-a
prediction made especially difficult when the desires of the natural
parent are in direct conflict with those interests.88 Seeking to avoid
the "extreme act"89 of termination, judges often cling to the hope that
"something might happen in the future to make the [natural] parents
more adequate," 90 such as a remission in alcohol-related violence,
overall improvements in parenting, or the abatement of chronic
mental illness. One study found that "[t]he faintest 'flicker of interest'
[offered by natural parents] often deters judges from severing the
rights of persons who have for years demonstrated unfitness, disinter-
est or an inability to be responsible parents."91 Thus, judges tend to
83 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 32, Table 1.
84 Regardless of the gains achieved through permanency planning, the fact that 20%
of foster children across the nation remain in "temporary" foster homes for periods ex-
ceeding six years indicates that termination of parental rights occurs too rarely. See
KNrrzER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 25. See also Tedford, supra note 56.
85 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 7.
86 Id. Professor Judith Areen observed:
[N]o one likes to decide to take a child from his or her parents-judges no
more than anyone else. Given the chance to pretend there is a possible
compromise, they will continue to extend what is labelled "temporary" fos-
ter care, even though five or six years is surely not temporary.
Judith Areen, Foster Care and the Law, in EMERGING RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 42, at 9
(1976).
87 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
88 Id.
89 KNrTZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 27.
90 Id.
91 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
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overemphasize biological ties92 or "require extensive, time-consuming
searches for putative fathers who have shown no interest in their
children."93
Caseworkers also contribute to the problem because they often
fail to initiate termination proceedings when they should.94 One rea-
son for this failure is that caseworkers are poorly paid and often pro-
fessionally unprepared,95 as well as overworked and overwhelmed by a
system that is overflowing with foster children.96 Although the Child
Welfare League of America recommends a caseload of twenty to thirty
cases per worker, the national average ranges from seventy-five to
ninety cases. 97 Thus, "[a] case worker's actual direct face-to-face con-
tact with the child and family may total under two work days per
year."98
A second reason for caseworkers' failure to initiate appropriate
termination proceedings is a lack of motivation. Studies have shown
that caseworkers, like judges, tend to overemphasize the importance
of the biological ties of natural parents;99 thus, they too may errone-
ously believe that termination does not benefit children. Even if they
do believe in the benefits of termination, caseworkers may think that
initiating proceedings is a waste of time, given the strong reluctance to
terminate natural parents' rights exhibited by judges.100 Further-
more, when caseworkers have not made repeated efforts to work with
children's natural parents (a common situation, due to social workers'
burdensome caseload), natural parents can easily defeat a termination
motion by arguing that they were-not given a chance to remedy their
problems. 1°1 Even when caseworkers have made such repeated ef-
forts, natural parents may defeat the motion due to a lack of docu-
92 KNITZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 27.
93 Id.
94 A 1987 report by the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families found
that "[a] majority of States noted that staff-related problems remain significant barriers to
serving children and families." H.R. REP. No. 260, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1987). Spe-
cific concerns expressed by state agencies were a "lack of staff to handles cases ... ; inade-
quate resources to hire and retain qualified staff... ; inadequate staff training ... and high
turnover .... " Id.
95 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
96 CRrrICAL FiRsT STEPs, supra note 5, at 36-38 (listing among the deficiencies within
the child protection system "major shortcomings in the status, recruitment, training, super-
vision, and caseloads of... caseworkers").
97 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
98 Id.
99 Id. See also Rein et al., supra note 52, at 42-44 (contending that social workers tend
to favor continued placement in foster care with middle class families rather than return
children to their original families and noting that such preferences may reflect a bias that
treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the
child).
100 KNrTzER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 27-28.
101 Id.
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mentation.10 2 Finally, if caseworkers feel that they have made
mistakes in their handling of a case, they may not wish to initiate ter-
mination proceedings which would expose their errors. 10 3
4. Addressing the Limbo Problem
Experts have offered solutions and recommendations for decreas-
ing the number of foster children who grow up in the unstable and
unhealthy environment of long-term foster care. Some critics assert
that no foster care at all is better than long-term foster care. 10 4 They
recommend foster care placement only if either all reasonable efforts
have been made to protect the child from severe harm in the home,
or the risk of severe harm within the home outweighs any harm that
may be occasioned by long-term foster care. 10 5 Others claim that the
guidelines and standards employed by agencies and caseworkers re-
quire greater specificity. 10 6 These critics maintain that this vagueness
makes it difficult for officials to identify properly otherwise remedia-
ble harm to the child, to select services appropriate for the problems
specific to the case, and to determine the necessary conditions for
establishing a permanent home. 10 7
Some child advocates recommend subsidized adoption' 08 and
mandatory, periodic review of each foster child's case by the courts or
an independent administrative body.10 9 Other obvious, but costly, so-
lutions include increased staffing, 10 more extensive training for
caseworkers" 1 and increased state and federal funding." 2 Although
their suggestions and methods vary, these experts are unified in their
agreement that changes must be made.
C. In re Gregory K.: Recognizing a Child's Right to Permanency
When a young foster child named Gregory Kingsley filed a termi-
nation suit against his natural parents in July 1992, he inspired an-
other proposal for reform: granting foster children the right to
initiate parental termination proceedings." 3 Although caseworkers,
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 PELTON, supra note 51, at 73-74.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 76.
107 Id.
108 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 8.
109 Id.
11o PELTON, supra note 51, at 77.
111 Id.
112 NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 6-7.
113 First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregory Kingsley (Fla. Cir. CL Oct. 13, 1992)
(No. JU90-5245), rev'd sub nom Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
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foster parents or guardians normally initiate termination proceedings
on behalf of foster children, Gregory hired an attorney and indepen-
dently entered a plea to sever the rights of his natural parents. 114
Many Americans who followed the case sympathized with Rachel
Kingsley, the natural mother, fearing that giving children the right to
independently bring termination proceedings would result in frivo-
lous suits or parent-shopping. 15 Gregory's decision to terminate rela-
tions, however, was far from impulsive. Indeed, many years of
maltreatment at the hands of a mother addicted to drugs and alcohol
prompted his decision." 6 Gregory's chemically dependent mother
had placed him in foster care four separate times before he was
twelve. Gregory spent only seven months out of the previous eight
years with his mother." 7 He lamented that he "didn't know... [his]
morn" "8 and insisted that he "wanted a family."" 9 Neither natural
parent communicated with him in any way during his last twenty
months in foster care, even though for eight of those twenty months
Rachel Kingsley lived only thirty minutes from her son's foster
home.120 Gregory spent most of his young life in a tumultuous and
unstable environment, and was plagued by feelings of insecurity and
low self-esteem. 12' Given the uncertainty of the foster environment
and the memories of past abuses at home, Gregory did not want to
return to his natural parents, hoping instead to be adopted or at least
to remain in foster care.' 22
Gregory finally found a family of his own when he moved into the
home of George and Lizabeth Russ in October 1991.123 Several
months after entering the stable and positive environment of the Russ
home,124 Gregory asked George and Lizabeth to adopt him. When
114 Neglect Debated at Child "Divorce" Tial, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 25, 1992, at A6 ("Never
before has a child been granted permission to hire his own attorneys to pursue a lawsuit of
this nature against his parents.").
115 See Lany King Live: Parents' Rights vs. Children's Rights-The Dilemma (CNN televi-
sion broadcast, Aug. 20, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT file; see also infra
notes 153-58 and accompanying text; Shapiro, supra note 28, at 317 ("Gregory K's case...
shows how the effort to broaden children's legal rights can unfairly affect 'undesirable'
parents, many of whom are poor, nonwhite or single mothers."). Ralph Kingsley, Greg-
ory's natural father, also had his rights terminated, but he was not the focus of national
attention because he consented to such termination when Gregory first filed his petition.
First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregoiy Kingsley (No. JU90-5245).
116 First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregoy Kingsley (No. JU90-5245).
117 Intriguing People, supra note 26, at 65.
118 /&L
119 Id.
120 First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregory Kingsley (No. JU90-5245).
121 Id. at 9.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 While living with the Russ family, Gregory excelled in school and developed a lov-
ing relationship with his foster parents and siblings. Id.
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they expressed a desire to do so, Gregory hired an attorney to help
him file a petition for termination with the Florida circuit court.
1. The Right to Initiate Parental Rights Termination Proceedings
Before the Florida circuit court would hear Gregory's petition,
Gregory had to establish that he had the right to initiate a termination
proceeding. Florida law does not explicitly grant minors the right to
file a termination petition. Section 39.461 of the Florida Statutes
merely provides that any "person who has knowledge of the facts al-
leged" may file a petition for termination of parental rights.125 In his
complaint, Gregory asserted that he had the right to bring the action
as both the real party in interest and a natural person and citizen
under the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution. 126
Gregory also argued that he had a right to initiate a termination pro-
ceeding because the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS), his guardian ad litem and his natural parents had "all
failed and refused to take appropriate action"' 27 to protect his consti-
tutional and legal rights as they were required to do under section
39.001 of the Florida Statutes.128 In his complaint, Gregory also al-
leged that HRS had "taken positions directly contrary to . . . [his]
claimed legal rights, wishes and desires....
a. The Right to Initiate Termination Proceedings under the Florida
Constitution
In an order that attracted widespread interest,130 Circuit Judge
Thomas A. Kirk ruled that Gregory had standing, thereby recognizing
his right to independently initiate a parental rights termination pro-
ceeding.13' Kirk concluded that Gregory was a natural person entitled
to the rights set forth in Article I of the Florida Constitution, includ-
125 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461 (West 1990).
126 First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregory Kingsley (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992)
(No. JU90-5245), rev'd sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
127 Id. at 2.
128 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001 (West 1990).
129 First Amended Complaint at 2, In re Gregoy Kingsley (No. JU90-5245).
130 See supra notes 26, 114, 115.
131 Judge Kirk departed from the common-law notion that children are nonpersons
without individual rights or obligations.
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ing: 3 2 the right to pursue happiness,1 33 the right to due process of
law, 34 the right of access to the courts of the state, 35 and the right to
make private choices.' 36 The court order also expressly noted that the
right to privacy described in the Florida constitution extends to all
natural persons, including minors.
b. The Florida Statutes
The court also held that Gregory's right to initiate the termina-
tion proceeding was supported by chapter thirty-nine of the Florida
Statutes, which addresses child custody issues.13 7 Judge Kirk noted
that this chapter provides for judicial and non-judicial proceedings
whereby children and other interested parties can receive fair hear-
ings and the recognition, protection and enforcement of their consti-
tutional rights. The court found particular support in section 39.461,
which provides that any "person who has knowledge of the facts al-
leged" may file a petition for termination of parental rights.'38 The
court concluded that as Gregory had knowledge of facts that could
support a claim for parental rights termination, section 39.461 gave
him the right to file his petition in Florida. 3 9
132 The circuit court held that Gregory was a natural person entitled to the rights set
forth in Article I of the Florida Constitution. Gregory K v. Ralph K, No. C192-5127, 1992
WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct.July 20, 1992). Under Article I, all natural persons are guaranteed
the right to pursue happiness, the right to due process of law, the right of access to the
courts of the state, and the right to make private choices. FL.A. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9, 21 and
23.
The court also reaffirmed that the right to privacy set forth in the Florida Constitution
extends to all natural persons, including minors. Gregory K, No. C192-5127, 1992 WL
551488 (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) which cites Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 74 (1976)). The court explained that
"[c] onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state defined age of majority." Id.
133 FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
134 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
135 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
136 FLA. CONsr. art. I, § 23.
137 The Florida circuit court also held that recognizing Gregory's standing to sue for
parental rights termination was consistent with Florida statutory law. Gregory K., No. C192-
5127, 1992 WL 551488. Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes provides forjudicial and nonju-
dicial proceedings whereby children and other interested parties can receive fair hearings
and the recognition, protection and enforcement of their constitutional rights. FiA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.001(2) (a) (West 1990). Public safety interests are also protected under Chapter
39.
Section 39.461 of the Florida Statutes provides that any "person who has knowledge of
the facts alleged" may file a petition for termination of parental rights. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
39.461 (West 1990). Because Gregory was a person with knowledge of facts that could
form the basis for a claim for parental rights termination, the court concluded that he
consequently had standing to file a petition under the Florida Statutes.
138 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.461 (1990).
139 Gregory K, No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488.
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2. Terminating the Rights of Rachel Kingsley
In subsequent proceedings the court held that Rachel Kingsley
had "permanently forfeited"' 40 all of her rights to Gregory.141 The
court based its decision on a number of factors, including the Russ
family's superior ability to provide for Gregory's needs, the greater
prospect of permanency with the Russ family, and the length of time
Gregory had spent in foster care.142 In making the decision to termi-
nate, the court also considered Gregory's preference in living arrange-
ments. Observing that Gregory was "intelligent, mature . . . [and
possessed] sufficient understanding and experience to express a rea-
sonable preference," the court noted that he had consistently and re-
peatedly expressed a desire to live with the Russ family.143 After
finding "clear and convincing evidence"'144 of all of the criteria for
termination contained in section 39.46(2) of the Florida Statutes,145
140 Final Judgment Terminating Parent/Child Relationship, In the Interest of Gregoiy K,
Case No.JU90-5245, at 11.
141 Ralph Kingsley, Gregory's father, also had his rights terminated. Mr. Kingsley is
not discussed in this section because he consented to such termination when Gregory first
filed his termination petition. See First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregory Kingsley
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992) (No.JU90-5245), rev'd sub nom Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d
780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
142 Final Judgment, supra note 140, at 9.
143 Id. at 9, 10.
144 Id. at9.
145 The court found that the following criteria had been proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence:
a. The inability of the mother to provide for the child's needs.
b. The endangerment of the child's health and well-being if returned to
the mother.
c. The special developmental needs of the child and how those needs are
best met with the Russ family.
d. The lack of any bond with the natural parents or natural siblings.
e. The length of the placement of the twelve year old child in foster care
for approximately 34 months of the past 36 months.
f. The availability of a permanent family placement for the child with the
Russ family.
g. The length and stability of the placement of the child with the Russ
family for approximately 11 months and the bond he has formed with the
foster parents and the foster siblings.
h. The preference the child has expressed consistently and repeatedly to
be placed with the Russ family for adoption and that it is the preference of
a child who is an intelligent, mature, twelve year old, who has sufficient
understanding and experience to express a reasonable preference.
i. The recommendation of the guardian ad litem that the parental rights
be terminated and that it is in the child's best interests to be placed with
the Russ family for adoption.
j. The lack of any suitable permanent custody arrangement with a relative
of the mother because of the prolonged absence of the mother and her
family from any significant role in the child's life and the importance and
strength of the bond he has formed with the foster family.
Id. at 9-10.
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the court concluded that termination was "manifestly in the best inter-
ests of... Gregory Kingsley." 146
3. Kingsley v. Kingsley: The Appellate Court's Partial Reversal
The trial court's final order should have been a happy ending to
Gregory's long journey through Florida's foster care system. How-
ever, Rachel Kingsley, Gregory's natural mother, immediately filed a
notice of appeal. 147 She brought her case before the Florida District
Court of Appeal alleging five separate grounds for appeal, including
the contention that Gregory, as a minor child, did not have the capac-
ity to bring a parental rights proceeding in his own right.148
Notwithstanding the fact that the appellate court affirmed the
lower court's finding that Rachel Kingsley had abandoned Gregory,
the appellate court agreed with her position that Gregory lacked the
capacity to initiate a parental rights termination proceeding. Citing
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(b), the court explained that
"unemancipated minors do not have the legal capacity to initiate legal
proceedings in their own names."' 49 Instead of petitioning the court
directly, a child must be represented by a guardian or next friend who
acts on the child's behalf. The court noted that representation of a
minor by a guardian ad litem or next friend "is required by the or-
derly administration ofjustice and the procedural protection of a mi-
nor's welfare and interest by the court."150 Accordingly, "the fact that
a minor is represented by counsel, in and of itself, is not sufficient."' 51
Although the appellate court's reversal undermines Gregory K.'s
usefulness in the effort to establish a foster child's right to initiate
termination proceedings, the basic arguments that initially persuaded
the Florida circuit court to recognize such a right may be more suc-
cessful in other states. Furthermore, several criticisms discredit the
appellate court's reasoning in Kingsley. Part III of this Note enumer-
ates these criticisms and also explores federal, state and common-law
alternatives for recognizing a foster child's right to initiate termina-
tion proceedings.
146 Id. at 10. The court also noted that Rachel Kingsley had not been a credible wit-
ness and that the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had acted
wrongfully in failing to file a petition for termination prior to April, 1992. Id. at 10.
147 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
148 Id. at 783.
149 Id. at 783-84.
150 Id. at 784.
151 Id.
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II
THE DEBATE OVER GRANTING CHILDREN THE RIGHT TO
INITIATE PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION
PROCEEDINGS
In the wake of the circuit court's initial order granting Gregory
the right to initiate a termination proceeding, family law experts and
child advocates engaged in fervent debates over children's rights.
Although at least one expert contended that Gregory's case was actu-
ally "less revolutionary than it sounds,"152 others strongly criticized the
court's ruling. The following section evaluates several arguments
against granting children the right to initiate termination proceed-
ings, 153 concluding that although some of these arguments raise valid
concerns, these concerns are outweighed by the countervailing needs
of foster children.
A. Evil Ramifications and Frivolous Claims
Some critics fear that granting children the right to indepen-
dently initiate proceedings to terminate parental relationships will un-
dermine traditional family values.154 They predict that recognizing
such a right will result in " 'evil and frightening' ramifications for fam-
ilies."' 55 Other critics are quick to envision disgruntled children filing
claims of misparenting over "insufficient allowances or too much spin-
ach for dinner."1 56 They fear that the recognition of such a right will
152 Pat Wingert & Eloise Salholz, Irreconcilable Differences, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at
84 (quoting commentary by Robert Mnookin, a family law expert at Stanford Law School).
These experts point out the regularity with which foster parents or guardians ad litem
initiate termination proceedings on behalf of foster children. See id.; see also Bryanna
Latoof, The New Children of Divorce, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at ID, 3D (quoting
Professor Martin Guggenheim as saying that "[t]he only thing about... [the Gregory K case]
that was interesting is that Gregory had to go out and get his own lawyer to bring an action
that served... as the catalyst for HRS changing its mind and recommending that the child
be removed from his mother's custody").
153 See infra notes 154-206 and accompanying text.
154 Id. See also Cheakalos, supra note 24, at A4 (quoting Rachel Kingsley's attorney as
saying that allowing a child to initiate termination proceedings "could undermine funda-
mental family values"); Keith Goldschmidt, Boy, 11, Seeks "Divorce" From Parents, Gannett
News Service, May 4, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library) (quoting Gary Bauer, presi-
dent of the Family Research Council, as saying that if children are granted such constitu-
tional privileges it would lead to "the destruction of the family unit").
155 Mark Hansen, Boy Wants "Divorce" From Parents, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 24 (quoting
Jim Sawyer, a lawyer for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services).
According to a spokesperson for the Family Research Council in Washington, D.C., Gregory
K "sends out the unfortunate message to children that 'your parents may not protect you,
so don't worry, you've got this out.' To tell children there's a divorce option out there-
that does not lend itself to strong families." Latoof, supra note 152, at 3D.
156 Bob Cohn, From Chattel to Full Citizens, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 88, 89. But see
Wingert & Salholz, supra note 152, at 84 ("Legal experts scoff at the idea that Gregory's
case would pave the way for frivolous lawsuits-for example, by teens who bridle at turning
down the stereo.").
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encourage an overwhelming number of fringe claims that are "best
left to the give-and-take of the home.' 57 Others argue that families
will be hurt because Gregory K.'s "ultimate message ... is that parents
in trouble may avoid turning to the state for help for fear of losing
their child."158
What these arguments fail to consider, however, is that the right
advocated in this Note, and recognized in Gregory K., is the limited
right of a child to file a petition and initiate a proceeding, in accord-
ance with statutory requirements, for the termination of parental
rights. Predictions by critics that the recognition of such a limited
right will result in the downfall of the American family and an on-
slaught of frivolous claims are misguided. 159 By equating the right of
foster children to petition a court for parental rights termination with
frivolous suits about allowances, these critics fail to appreciate the seri-
ousness of the problems faced by children in long-term foster care.
Jack Levine, executive director of the Florida Center for Children and
Youth, and a supporter of the Gregory K. ruling, eloquently refutes
many of the protests voiced by "family values" critics:
[I]t's essential to say what this case is not. This case is not a divorce
case. This case is not a situation of a child rejecting the spinach that
his parents served and taking them to court. This is not frivolous.
This is not about promoting disrespect of children for their parents.
And the last thing this is not is a wide-open door for children to get
their way from a judge where they haven't gotten their way from a
parent. What this case is, is a cry of desperation from a child who
has lived the majority of his life in a state of legal limbo. It is a
desperate attempt to find some security and stability for a child who
157 Cohn, supra note 156, at 89.
158 Latoof, supra note 152, at 3D (paraphrasing Professor Martin Guggenheim). Ac-
cording to Professor Guggenheim, Gregory K creates a situation that is similar to a house
fire in which
a mother stands amid the flames holding her child as she looks out of a
window at people holding a net. There's an implicit understanding that if
she throws her child to safety, the child's savers will return the baby to her
when she gets out herself. But if you change the rules so that parents can't
be confident they'll get their kids back, they ain't going to turn to the sys-
tem in the first place.
Id. It is unclear, however, why Guggenheim believes that the Gregory K holding will serve
to instill such reluctance, because termination can and, ideally, should be achieved without
action by the foster child. Perhaps he means to suggest that mothers who place their chil-
dren in foster care are justifiably relying on the general inability of state welfare systems to
meet statutory requirements and pursue the goals and policies underlying the laws and
permanency planning. Guggenheim seems to be saying that allowing children to take ac-
tion when the state fails to meet their needs and protect their rights is somehow unfair to
the parents of these children, who assume that the state welfare agencies will ignore their
children, keeping them in foster care as long as it takes for the parents to become fit,
competent adults capable of caring for their children.
159 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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has known neither since his toddlerhood. And it is, in every sense
of the word, a very strict case of law enforcement.160
Additionally, the critics forget that foster children seeking to file
a petition for parental rights termination must comply with the same
substantive and procedural requirements that are imposed upon adult
petitioners. 161 Sanctions that deter attorneys from filing frivolous law-
suits on behalf of adult clients should also deter those representing
children from filing irresponsible claims. 162 Furthermore, the right to
file a petition is not the last step: a foster child must convince a court
that termination is in her best interests. Ajudge reviews the merits of
a child's claim and also considers arguments proffered by both the
state and the natural parents.' 63 These substantive and procedural
requirements are more than adequate to ensure that the right to initi-
ate termination proceedings is unlikely to be abused if placed in the
hands of foster children.
B. Decisionmaking and Psychological Trauma
Some legal scholars worry that involving children in these critical
and emotionally-charged decisions might harm them psychologi-
cally.' 64 Others argue that it is inappropriate for children to deter-
mine whether a given family or living arrangement is harmful for
them insofar as children could be "satisfied with circumstances that
are not in their best interest."1 65 Another concern is that later in life
these children may not only experience tremendous guilt but also re-
alize that they sought termination merely to retaliate against their par-
ents for placing them in foster care. 66
These critics tend to overlook several important facts. First, in
any termination proceeding, whether initiated by the foster child or a
caseworker, the judge is responsible for the final decision. Allowing a
child to initiate termination proceedings should not be equated with
relying upon a child to determine what living arrangement is in her
160 Latoof, supra note 152, at 3D.
161 See, e.g., supra note 138 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
163 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.467(2) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that in "deter-
mining the manifest best interests of the child, the court shall consider and evaluate all
relevant factors").
164 Cohn, supra note 156, at 89 (referring to Professor Martin Guggenheim's observa-
tion that it would be " 'terrible ... if Gregory gets what he wants and 10 years later suffers
an emotional breakdown' because he chose one set of parents over the other"). See also
Shapiro, supra note 28, at 318 ("What will Gregory feel in five or ten years when he reflects
upon his high-profile case, including his public rejection of his birth mother?"). Addition-
ally, some child experts fear that "even mediagenic kids like Gregory can be psychologically
harmed by too much publicity." Id.
165 LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREsT? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR
CHILDREN 139 (1992).
166 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 318.
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best interests. Additionally, even state-initiated termination proceed-
ings involve foster children, albeit less directly, in the decision to sever
parental rights. 167 Finally, the instability of foster care can intellectu-
ally and emotionally damage foster children. 68 Indeed, the psycho-
logical trauma that a foster child might experience as a result of filing
a termination petition may be no greater than that which the child
would have suffered during a state-initiated termination proceeding
or through continued, long-term foster care.
C. Termination and Adoption: Are They In the Best Interests of
Foster Children?
Some family law experts argue generally that emphasizing termi-
nation of parental rights and adoption are inappropriate vehicles for
addressing the foster care crisis. 169 Termination of parental rights,
they contend, does not ensure that a child will receive more stable
placement. 170 For support, they point to the fact that children "freed"
by termination proceedings must often wait over a year for
adoption.171
Noting that the average age of children in foster care is higher
than it used to be,172 these experts also maintain that it is unrealistic
to expect twelve-year-old children to simply forget their natural par-
ents and to start over with a new family.173 By that age ties with the
natural parents may be too firmly established. The vast majority of
foster children have lived with, and have memories of, their natural
parents. 174 As older children with more substantial ties to their natu-
ral parents have moved into the "adoption marketplace," there has
been a corresponding increase of instances wherein prospective adop-
tive parents decide to return the child after placement but before
adoption.175
167 See PURDY, supra note 165, at 139.
168 See Leon Eisenberg, The Sins of the Fathers: Urban Decay and Social Pathology, 32 AM.J.
OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 5, 14 (1962); Wald, supra note 62, at 667-74.
169 Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 455-74
(1983).
170 Id. at 472-73. This Note assumes that these experts would argue against parental
rights termination irrespective of whether a child, the state or a guardian ad litem initiated
the termination proceeding.
171 NE YORx STATE CHILD WELFARE INFO. SERV., SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF
CHILDREN IN CARE OR RECENTLY DISCHARGED (1980).
172 CRITICAL FIRST STEps, supra note 5, at xiv. See also KNrrzER & ALLEN, supra note 13,
at 186 (according to a 1976 national survey, 51% of the children in out-of-home care were
12 or older, and 31% were 15 or older).
173 Garrison, supra note 169, at 472.
174 Id. at 471.
175 See Celia Bass, Matchmaker-Matchmaker: Older Child Adoption Failures, 54 CHLD WEL-
FARE 505, 507 (1975).
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These experts also cite studies revealing that adopted children
often suffer the same confused identity, insecurity and guilt that
trouble children in long-term foster care.' 76 They argue that these
studies strongly suggest that adoption, by itself, "does not resolve the
insecurity that results from not 'belonging' to a natural parent.'1' 7
Adoption, however, is neither intended to be a complete cure
nor a quick fix for the psychological problems of foster children. The
fact that adoption does not immediately instill foster children with a
feeling of complete security is certainly not surprising. Recovery from
the psychological wounds of a childhood filled with turmoil and insta-
bility may be a slow and painful process. A stable adoptive family envi-
ronment is more conducive to the healing process than long-term
foster care, which often heightens a child's feelings of insecurity and
inadequacy. Furthermore, the studies relied on by these experts are
not universally accepted; other sources report that it is unclear
whether adoptees actually have a higher rate of mental disturbance
than the general population. s78 Finally, the failure of some welfare
agencies to place children with adoptive parents immediately follow-
ing a termination proceeding does not justify preventing children
from seeking termination and adoption.
According to some critics, however, even if it can be assumed that
termination and adoption are viable practices, such practices are by
no means the best methods for providing children in foster care with
stable, loving homes. 179 These critics contend that permanency plan-
ning goes beyond what is necessary to provide continuity and stability
for foster children.'80 Continuity of care, they argue, can be ensured
through permanent custody arrangements that, unlike adoption, do
not disrupt parental visitation.' 8 ' They maintain that alternative solu-
tions might assure stable placements without requiring the complete
severance of parental rights.' 82 They fear that espousing termination
176 Garrison, supra note 169, at 469-72. In part, Garrison relies on Marshall D.
Schechter et al., Emotional Problems in the Adoptee, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 37 (1964);
Robert Schwam & Albert Tuskan, The Adopted Child, in 1 BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHI-
ATRY 342. 343 U. Noshpitz ed., 1979).
177 Garrison, supra note 169, at 471 (citing Schwam & Tuskan, supra note 176, at 343,
for the proposition that an adopted child may fear being given away again).
178 See Delores A. Taylor & Philip Starr, The Use of Clinical Services by Adoptive Parents, 11
J. Am. AcAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 384, 386-87 (1972) (criticizing methodology).
179 See Garrison, supra note 169, at 425. See generally Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Op-
tions to Achieve Permanence for Children in Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 128,
139-78 (Mark Hardin et al. eds., 1987) (providing a detailed analysis of legal placement
options other than adoption that are available for children in foster care).
180 Garrison, supra note 169, at 425.
181 Id. at 425, 474.
182 Garrison explains that:
A guardianship order, for example, would enable the child to remain in a
single foster home where he may have developed ties, while permitting con-
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of parental rights as the sole solution to the foster care drift provides a
disincentive to improve the poor services currently available to par-
ents and foster children. 8 3
The debate over permanency planning and the wisdom of paren-
tal rights termination may never be resolved. Currently, however, an
overwhelming majority of family law experts, child advocates, legisla-
tors and child psychologists favor permanency planning. 8 4 Because it
is unlikely that parental termination statutes and current child welfare
schemes will be eliminated at any time in the near future, it is more
practical to formulate solutions to the current foster care problem
that can be implemented within the existing framework of the child
welfare system. Granting children the right to initiate termination
proceedings will help improve already existing permanency planning
programs.
D. The Rights of Natural Parents
Courts face a difficult task when attempting to differentiate the
rights of parents and children. In the past, commentators have criti-
cized the judiciary for restricting the rights of parents who have
placed their children in foster care.' 8 5 It is arguable that extending
the right to file termination petitions to foster children will contribute
to the limitation of parental rights.
Some critics maintain that courts, guided by permanency plan-
ning standards, adopt an implicit presumption that foster children are
better off without their natural parents.'8 6 According to these critics,
this presumption is unsupported by any evidence, causes unnecessary
foster care placements which result in lengthy separations, and ig-
nores the important role that the natural parents of children in long-
term foster care can and do play in their children's development.187
Some also criticize expanding children's rights to include the
ability to initiate termination proceedings because doing so will serve
only to further curtail the rights of natural parents who are indigent
tinued visitation by the natural parents and other family members. A long
term foster care contract could accomplish a similar result; the contract
could prohibit child welfare agency from removing the child from the fos-
ter home and could clarify the rights of both foster and natural parents.
Id. at 444; see also Hardin, supra note 179, at 139-78.
183 Garrison, supra note 169, at 473.
184 See id. at 449; see also NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 10; VICTOR PIKE
Er AL, PERMANENT PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CA.RE: A HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL
WoRERs 1-5 (1977); cf. Wald, supra note 62, at 667-76 (assessing evils of temporary
placements).
185 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 169, at 472; Shapiro, supra note 28, at 318.
186 Garrison, supra note 169, at 472.
187 Id. at 473.
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or people of color.188 According to this argument, those advocating
children's legal rights are not only paternalistic but will only succeed
in "giving 'racist and classistjudges' more power to control parents
and kids under the guise of doing what is in the best interests of the
child."' 8 9
Critics also postulate that the emphasis placed on termination by
child advocates stems directly from "[t] he child welfare system's...
traditional disdain for natural parents."' 90 They disagree with perma-
nency planning's theoretical position that "the law must make the
child's needs paramount"' 91 or that "permanency in relationships"
represents the foremost developmental need of a child.' 92 This ap-
proach, they argue, unduly restricts the rights of the natural parents;
it relies on the false premise that a foster parent who has established a
relationship with the child should be given preference over a natural
parent even when the natural parent who lost custody was not at
fault.'9 3
Such concerns about parental rights are misplaced. They over-
look that the primary goal of permanency planning is to reunite foster
children with their natural parents. 194 When it becomes clear, how-
ever, that the child cannot return to her natural home, permanency
planning suggests that the child's right to be raised in a permanent
and healthy home outweighs the natural parents' right to maintain
legal ties with the child.' 95 The decision to terminate parental rights
is not based on the presumption that children are better off without
their natural parents or that a foster parent who has bonded with the
child should be preferred over a natural parent. Generally, termina-
tion occurs only when there is clear and convincing evidence' 96 that
188 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 318 (quoting Professor Martin Guggenheim as saying
that even in an unbiased legal system "the parents affected by expanding children's legal
rights would overwhelmingly be indigent, because their lives are highly regulated by the
government and their children are the ones whose 'rights' child-welfare professionals want
to protect... [and these professionals) pursue the worst class-based policies and are very
unfair to people of color").
189 Id. (quoting Professor Guggenheim).
190 Garrison, supra note 169, at 446.
191 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 73, at 7.
192 Id. at 99.
193 Id. at 99-100.
194 See ANTHONY N. MALUCCOO ET AL., PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN: CONCET
AND METHODs 3-5 (1986). Although the concept of permanency planning has evolved over
the years, experts generally agree that the term permanency planning "refers to the idea of
moving the child as soon as possible out of temporary substitute care and returning him or
her to the family as the preferred alternative . . . ." Id.
195 See NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 10 ("The rights of neglectful or
incapable parents should not have priority over the rights of children to a permanent,
stable home.").
196 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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the natural parents have either abandoned the child, 9 7 engaged in
extreme and repetitious child abuse or neglect,1 98 experienced radical
deterioration of the parent-child relationship, 199 or failed to remedy
the conditions that caused the separation. 200 Once one of these is
proven, and it is concluded that the child cannot safely return home,
the court must also determine whether termination is in the child's
best interests.20' Permanency planning recognizes that "[b] ecause ter-
mination ends all parent-child contact, it is important to consider
whether termination will lead to a more secure and appropriate home
for the child."202
It is generally accepted that a parent has "special interests in his
or her child,"203 and the Supreme Court has referred to parental
rights as "fundamental." 20 4 These interests and rights, however, are
not absolute. Sometimes, the child's right to a permanent and
healthy home clearly outweighs the right of the natural parent to
maintain legal ties with the child.205 Allowing foster children to raise
the issue of termination before the courts will not cause the deteriora-
tion of parental rights. It merely gives children the ability to assert
their own rights. Regardless of who files the termination petition, the
court still makes the ultimate decision by weighing the interests of the
child.
E. The Case for Granting Foster Children the Right to Initiate
Parental Rights Termination Proceedings
The arguments against granting foster children the right to initi-
ate termination proceedings are outweighed by the benefits that such
a right would provide for foster children. Primarily, the right to peti-
tion for termination provides a self-help measure for foster children
wronged by neglectful or abusive parents and disadvantaged by an
overburdened social welfare system.20 6
197 Mark A. Hardin & Ann Shalleck, Children Living Apart from Their Parents, in LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDPEN § 9.17 (Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1984).
198 Id. § 9.20.
199 Id. § 9.21.
200 Id. § 9.18.
201 Id. § 9.16.
202 Id.
203 Julie S. Rappaport, Note, The Legal System's Response to Child Abuse: A "Shield"for
Children or a "Sword" Against the Constitutional Rights of Parents?, 11 J. HUM. RTS. 257, 262
(1991).
204 Id. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) (discussing the
rights of parents to decide to send their children to private and parochial schools as the
"very essence of personal liberty and freedom").
205 See NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 16, at 10.
206 Cohn, supra note 156, at 89.
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1. Giving Children a Voice in a System that Fails to Speak on Their
Behalf
Many of the problems created by unresponsive caseworkers and
guardians ad litem may be avoided by giving children a formal, in-
dependent means of initiating termination proceedings.207 Providing
children independent access to court may also alleviate problems that
arise when states fail to comply with statutes requiring the appoint-
ment of guardians ad litem for children abused or neglected,20 8 or
where guardian ad litem programs are woefully inadequate. For ex-
ample, in 1991 Gregory Kingsley's home state of Florida attempted to
eliminate its guardian ad litem program, despite the fact that over two
thirds of the 11,300 wards of Florida remain in foster care longer than
the eighteen months permitted by law.209 Allowing foster children to
independently initiate termination proceedings would provide them
with a means of self-help when the system entrusted with ensuring
their welfare fails to do so.
2. Gregory Kingsley: Demonstrating How Legal Self-Help Can Lead
to Permanency
Gregory's case illustrates how the right to initiate termination
proceedings allows children to achieve permanency by helping them
escape state foster care systems inundated by overworked welfare
agents and ineffective or nonexistent guardians ad litem. Despite an
eighteen month statutory limit on foster placements,2 10 the Florida
welfare system allowed Gregory Kingsley to remain in foster care for
thirty months.21' Welfare officials did not return Gregory to the cus-
tody of his natural parents at the eighteen month judicial review hear-
ing, and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
failed to initiate a termination proceeding as they were required by
statute to do,
207 Id.
208 Larry Rohter, To Save or End a Troubled Parent's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1992, at
C1 (referring to comments made by Florida Judge Hugh Glickstein, former head of the
ABA's Family Law Section for Children).
209 When Florida sought to eliminate its guardian ad litem program, attorney Karen
Gievers filed suit. Gievers previously had filed a class-action suit to force the state to im-
prove the foster care system and compel modification of the state's "long-term foster care"
policy. In January 1992, Gievers and the state "reached a cease-fire agreement, in which
the governor promised to phase in improvements in the foster care system over the next
three years." Wingert & Salholz, supra note 152, at 86.
210 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.454(2) requires that if a child is not returned to the physical
custody of his natural parents at the time of the eighteen month judicial review hearing,
the HRS shall initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights unless extraordinary circum-
stances require that the child should continue to live in foster care.
211 See generally First Amended Complaint at 3-9, In re Gregory Kingsley (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 13, 1992) (No. JU90-5245), revd sub. nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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unless, at the time of the judicial review, the court finds that the
situation of the child is so extraordinary that the agreement should
be extended. If the court decides to extend the agreement, the
court shall enter detailed findings justifying the decision to extend,
as well as the length of the extension.2 12
HRS failed to present "extraordinary circumstances" for the exten-
sion, and the court failed to issue the requisite express findings justify-
ing the decision to extend.2 1 3 In the proceedings initiated to extend
Gregory's foster care agreement for an additional six months, welfare
agents also disregarded statutory dictates. By failing to provide Greg-
ory with a competent attorney, 214 the state effectively denied him the
opportunity to advocate his position. It was only when Gregory re-
sorted to legal self-help that the state recognized his needs and
desires. By exercising his right to initiate a termination proceeding,
Gregory removed himself from the limbo experienced by many foster
children and became a happy member of a loving family.2 15
III
RECOGNIZING A FOSTER CHILD'S RIGHT TO INITIATE
TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS: EXPLORING THE
FEDERAL, STATE AND COMMON LAW
POSSIBILITIES
This Note proposes that all foster children should be granted the
right to petition the court and initiate parental rights termination pro-
ceedings. Granting foster children the right to initiate such proce&d-
ings will help ensure that a child's right to a permanent, stable home
is given priority over the rights of neglectful or incapable parents.
Recognizing such a right will not completely cure the ills of the foster
care system, but it will help reduce the number of children con-
demned to travel through a series of foster homes for the greater part
of their formative years, never knowing the love, confidence and se-
curity of permanent home life.
To be effective, a foster child's right to initiate termination pro-
ceedings must be grounded in either a constitutional guarantee, a
statutory provision or a common law rule. The following sections ex-
plore constitutional, statutory and common-law bases for this right at
both the federal and state level. This Note also discusses criticisms of
212 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.454(2) (1990).
213 First Amended Complaint at 7, In re Gregory Kingsley (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992)
(No. JU90-5245), rev'd sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1993).
214 Id. at 12.
215 Intriguing Peope, supra note 26, at 65.
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the Kingsley court's decision to deny children the right to indepen-
dently initiate parental rights termination proceedings.
A. The Federal Constitution
1. Limited Rights
Federal law offers little assistance to powerless foster children
seeking to escape the limbo of foster care. Litigants have had limited
success attacking the constitutionality of foster care placement and re-
moval procedures. 216 In many of the cases addressing foster care,
courts have focused on the rights of foster families or parents.21 7 Few
have considered the status of foster children. Indeed, the courts have
consistently rejected arguments for increased constitutional protec-
tion of children's rights.218 These rejections have continued in spite
of the Supreme Court's recognition that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."2 1 9 District
courts have declared that "children are 'persons' within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment"220 with "the same right as adults to
freedom of, and privacy in, family life."'22 Despite these broad state-
ments of constitutional principle, courts have been reluctant to grant
foster children any meaningful rights under the Constitution.
Almost none of the constitutional arguments proffered by liti-
gants have persuaded the federal courts to expand the scope of consti-
tutional protection for foster children.222 Courts have rejected
216 Litigation concerning the constitutional status and rights of foster parents and fos-
ter children is a relatively recent phenomenon. No federal cases involving these issues
were reported prior to the 1970s.
217 See Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The Smith Court held that foster parents
not only have standing to assert the claim that they have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the integrity of their family unit, but that they also have standing to raise the
rights of the foster children in their attack on the state procedures, even where court-
appointed counsel represents the children. See id. at 841-42 & nn.44-45; see also Drum-
mond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). Drummond
held that a foster parent seeking to "exercise the right enjoyed by all other persons to
adopt a child has the same liberty interest to protect as does a person who seeks the right
to marry." Id. at 853.
218 Smith, 431 U.S. at 851-52; Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
219 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
220 Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp.
277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The district
court also held that "before a foster child can be peremptorily transferred from the foster
home in which he has been living .... he is entitled to a hearing at which all concerned
parties may present any relevant information to the administrative decisionmaker charged
with determining the future placement of the child." Id. at 282. Although the court of
appeals reversed, it failed to address the assertion that foster children were "persons"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
221 Beame, 412 F. Supp. at 602.
222 See Smith, 431 U.S. at 842-47; Beame, 412 F. Supp. at 602-09.
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arguments that foster children have a substantive due process right to
an adoptive home.223 Additionally, a federal court dismissed an
Eighth Amendment claim that the continued custody of foster chil-
dren in foster homes may constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment.224 Courts have also rejected the argument that decent, safe and
sanitary housing is an essential component of a full and adequate fam-
ily life and, thus, should be a constitutionally protected fundamental
right.2 25 Given the reluctance of the federal courts to recognize the
rights of foster children, it is difficult to formulate a successful federal
constitutional claim establishing a foster child's right to initiate termi-
nation proceedings. The next subsection discusses one way to estab-
lish such a right under the United States Constitution.
2. A Foster Child's Constitutional Rights Under Smith v. OFFER
The argument that a foster child's right to initiate termination
proceedings is a right guaranteed under the Constitution can be
based on Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform
(OFFER),226 a case the Supreme Court decided in 1977. In Smith, a
group of individual foster parents and an organization of foster fami-
lies initiated a class action suit against the state of New York and New
York City welfare officials alleging that the statutory and regulatory
procedures for removing foster children from foster homes violated
both the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment.227 The plaintiffs contended that placement of a
223 Beame 412 F. Supp. at 607-08. The court noted that one could not equate the child
plaintiff's status while in the foster care of the state with those civilly committed to the
state's custody because of mental illness, physical retardation or other similar ailments. Id.
at 608. Accordingly, if foster care is merely state provision of a substitute home for chil-
dren whose parents have failed to adequately care for them, then keeping children under
such "substitute guardianship" cannot be considered a denial of treatment. Id.
224 Id. The court noted that to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment, "confinement or restrictions.. . must be 'characterized by conditions
and practices so bad as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people,' or
must exceed the 'limits of civilized standards.'" Id. (citing Thartarella v. Kelley, 349 F.
Supp. 575, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)) (citations
omitted). Plaintiffs did not challenge the living conditions of the foster homes, but argued
instead that "'continued confinement,' even in comfortable foster homes, is, ipso facto,
cruel and unusual punishment as long as permanent adoption is a viable alternative." Id.
The court found that this argument failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Id.
225 Id. at 603 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) for the proposition
that "the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill
.... Absent [a] constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing... [is a]
legislative, notjudicial, function[ ]").
226 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
227 The New York statutes give placement agencies discretion to remove a child from a
foster home with ten days advance notice of removal. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw §§ 383(2), 400
(McKinney 1992). Objecting foster parents may request a conference with the Depart-
ment of Social Services (DSS). At the conference, foster parents may appear with counsel
to learn the reasons for the removal and may submit reasons opposing the action. The
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child with a foster family for over a year creates an emotional tie be-
tween the foster child and her foster family. As a result of this emo-
tional bond, the foster family becomes the "true 'psychological family'
of the child."2 28 Plaintiffs argued that "psychological" families have a
liberty interest in their own survival, which is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.229 Accordingly, the
members of the class action asserted that a "foster child cannot be
removed without a prior hearing satisfying due process." 230
The district court, although disclaiming any need to "reach out to
decide such novel questions"231 as those presented by the foster par-
ents, found a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the "right to
be heard before being 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' "232 The
court found that "children are 'persons' within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment whose rights are entitled to protection."233
Therefore, the court noted the "harmful consequences of a precipi-
tous and perhaps improvident decision to remove a child from his
foster family"234 and concluded that the "pre-removal procedures...
[were] constitutionally defective. '23 5 Thus, the court held that a foster
child is "entitled to a hearing"236 before being "peremptorily trans-
ferred from the foster home in which he has been living."23 7
The Supreme Court reversed the district court.23 8 Finding that
existing New York procedures adequately protected any liberty inter-
agency officials conducting the conference must render a written decision within five days
of the conference and send notice of the decision to both the foster parent and the appro-
priate agency. If the official decides to remove the child, the foster parents may appeal to
DSS, which then conducts a full adversarial administrative hearing. The results of the ad-
ministrative hearing are subject to judicial review, but removal of the child is not stayed
pending either the hearing or the judicial review. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 18,
§ 443.5 (1988).
228 Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 839 (1977).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp.
277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
232 Id. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,J., concurring)). On review the Supreme Court noted that,
if the liberty interest the district court sought to protect grew out of the affective ties be-
tween child and foster parents, then "we do not see how [this reasoning] differs from a
holding that the foster family relationship is entitled to privacy protection analogous to the
natural family-the issue the District Court purported not to reach." Smith, 431 U.S. at 840
n.43.
233 Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. at 282.
234 Id. at 283.
235 Id. at 282.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Smith, 431 U.S. at 839. Smith leaves open the question of what procedural rights are
to be afforded to foster parents and children, but apparently the Court believed that an
automatic hearing would provide little benefit for most children. This conclusion was par-
tially based on the premise that as foster parents have the right to request such a hearing,
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ests that the plaintiffs might have, the Court declined to establish a
foster child's right to an automatic due process hearing prior to re-
moval from an authorized foster home.23 9 Avoiding the liberty inter-
est question, the Court rested its conclusion on narrower grounds.2 40
The Smith Court failed to resolve the question of whether foster
children have a per se constitutionally protected liberty interest 241 or
property interest242 in the foster relationship. The Court did hold,
however, that foster parents had standing to bring a claim asserting the
violation of their constitutionally protected liberty interest in the in-
tegrity of their family.2 43 By equating the foster child's liberty interest
with that of the foster parents, the Court effectively evaded all of the
arguments regarding the liberty or property interests of individual fos-
ter children.2 44 In his concurrence, Justice Stewart stated that the
"Court surmises that foster families who share these [emotional] at-
tachments might enjoy the same constitutional [liberty] interest in
'family privacy' as natural families."2 45
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Smith does not completely
preclude an argument that foster children should have the right to
initiate termination proceedings; a matter which directly concerns
their family relationships. The Smith majority strongly emphasized
that "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relation-
ships,"2 46 but conceded that a foster family could "hold the same place
no interest of the child can be served by requiring a hearing to assess the emotional impact
of removal from foster parents who did not care enough for the child to request one. Id. at
847-50. The Court also noted that during a period of approximately two years, less than
one percent of foster parents faced with a transfer requested a hearing. Id. at 851.
JohnJ. Musewicz notes, however, that in rejecting the right to automatic hearings, the
Court failed to consider "(1) whether foster parents knew and understood the right to
such a hearing, (2) whether foster parents were functionally able to initiate a hearing, and
(3) whether a specific alternative foster home should be chosen for the child based on
unsupervised discretion of agency personnel." Musewicz, supra note 72, at 663-64 n.107.
239 Smith, 431 U.S. at 850-51.
240 The Supreme Court noted that "even on the assumption that appellees have a pro-
tected 'liberty interest,' the District Court erred in holding that the preremoval procedures
presently employed by the State [were] constitutionally defective." Smith, 431 U.S. at 847.
The Court went on to hold that "the procedures provided by New York State ... and New
York City ... are adequate to protect whatever liberty interests appellees may have." Id. at
856.
241 Two circuit courts have addressed the liberty issue and denied its existence. See
Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 697-99 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v.
Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206-09 (5th Cir. 1977)
(en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978). The Fifth Circuit has recognized a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest for foster parents seeking to adopt a child. See Drummond v.
Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 853-55 (5th Cir. 1977).
242 The Smith court never considered the property interest claim rejected by the Dis-
trict Court because plaintiffs failed to renew this argument. 431 U.S. at 839.
243 Id. at 841-42 & nn.44-45.
244 Id. at 838-40, 850.
245 Id. at 861 (Stewart, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 843.
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in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing
functions, as a natural family. ' 247 Under the Court's analysis, the pri-
mary distinction between foster families and natural families is the
contractual nature of foster relationships. The Court noted that, in
removing children from a foster home, the state interferes with a rela-
tionship originating in state law.2 48 In contrast, "the liberty interest in
family privacy has its source ... in intrinsic human rights, as they have
been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition.' "249
Yet, the interest of a foster child in establishing an enduring fam-
ily relationship stems from an "intrinsic human right."250 Accord-
ingly, the Court should not have characterized the foster child's right
to initiate a proceeding to terminate the rights of their natural par-
ents as one involving a contractual, non-biological relationship.
Rather, the Court should have recognized that foster children have a
fundamental, intrinsic human right to make decisions regarding their
familial relationships, including the decision to initiate termination
proceedings against their natural parents. Furthermore, even if termi-
nation proceedings must be characterized as involving relationships
with non-biological parents, such as foster parents or future adoptive
parents, the Court's distinction between relationships based on
human rights and contractual rights should not apply. Foster chil-
dren do not "knowingly assume[ ] [a] contractual relation with the
State"251 when they are placed in foster care.
Instead of recognizing the foster child's fundamental interest, the
Smith Court equated the child's liberty interests with those of a foster
parent.2 52 In so doing, the Court ignored the child's need for an en-
during family relationship, which is essential to her emotional and
physical well-being. For a foster child, the interest in a healthy family
environment is a need so fundamental that it cannot be equated with
the contractual, limited liberty interests253 of the foster parents.
Therefore, the Court should have recognized that foster children
have a separate, fundamental right to permanence-the right to a sta-
ble and enduring family relationship, even if that family is not biologi-
cally based.2 54
247 Id. at 844.
248 Id. at 845.
249 Id. at 845 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
250 Id. (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 838-39.
253 Id. at 846.
254 See Musewicz, supra note 72, at 661-78 (advocating judicial recognition of a funda-
mental right to permanence).
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3. A Foster Child's Right to Be Free From Undue Procedural Burdens
If a child has a right to an enduring family relationship, then a
state should not be permitted to impose procedural barriers that
unduly impede a child's attempts to achieve such permanence.
Although states generally "may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independ-
ently,"255 they may not unreasonably burden a minor's pursuit of a
fundamental right.256 Given the failure of welfare officials and guardi-
ans ad litem to initiate termination proceedings on behalf of long-
term foster children, the denial of a foster child's right to initiate ter-
mination proceedings constitutes an undue limitation on that child's
fundamental constitutional rights.2 57
a. Bellotti v. Baird: Arguments for a Foster Child's Right to
Initiate a Termination Proceeding
Minors have successfully made similar arguments in cases involv-
ing statutes requiring parental consent for abortion.2 58 In these cases,
the Supreme Court recognized that states have some latitude to limit
the procedural rights of minors, but held that they cannot place an
unreasonable burden on minors' exercise of certain fundamental
rights. In Bellotti v. Baird,259 the Court found that a Massachusetts stat-
ute requiring parental consent before an abortion could be per-
formed on an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen was
unconstitutional in two ways. First, the statute allowed judicial author-
ization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who was mature
and competent to make the decision independently.2 60 Second, the
statute required parental consultation or notification in every case, de-
nying pregnant minors the opportunity to receive an independent ju-
dicial determination that they are mature enough to consent to the
abortion or that the abortion would be in their best interest.2 61
255 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979).
256 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Bellott4
443 U.S. at 640, 643 n.23).
257 In some cases, foster children's right to permanence can only be enforced through
termination proceedings. Overburdened or unresponsive foster care officials often fail to
initiate such proceedings; consequently, children must resort to self-help to effectuate
their right to permanence. State rules incapacitating minors, however, prevent children
from doing so. See supra notes parts I.C.1. & II.E.1.
258 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
259 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
260 Id. at 649-51.
261 The Court emphasized that "the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not
be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to court." Id. at 648.
The Court also determined that "every pregnant minor is entitled in the first instance to go
directly to the court for a judicial determination without prior parental notice, consulta-
tion, or consent." Id. at 649.
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In reaching its decision, the Court set forth three justifications
for the conclusion that a child's constitutional rights cannot always be
equated with the rights of an adult: (1) "the peculiar vulnerability of
children;" 262 (2) the "inability [of children] to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner;"2 63 and (3) "the importance of the
parental role in child rearing."264 In addition to recognizing these
three justifications for limiting the rights of children, the Court noted
that the Massachusetts statute promoted a constitutionally permissible
state interest by encouraging unmarried, pregnant minors to seek
help and advice from their parents when making the decision whether
or not to have a child.2 65
Despite these findings, the Court found the "unique nature and
consequences of the abortion decision" determinative.2 66 The right
to seek an abortion, the Court noted, "differs in important ways from
other decisions that may be made during minority."2 67 The decision
to have an abortion "is one that simply cannot be postponed"2 68 be-
cause failure to make a timely abortion decision will often result in
grave and indelible consequences. 2 69 Thus, due to the uniqueness of
the abortion decision, 270 the Court concluded that the Massachusetts
statute inappropriately gave "a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to
terminate the patient's pregnancy. "271
A better approach, the Court suggested, would be to provide
pregnant minors with the opportunity to demonstrate in a formal pro-
ceeding either (1) "that she is mature enough and well enough in-
formed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her
physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she
is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion
would be in her best interests."272 Thus, the Court created an excep-
tion to the general rule prohibiting children from independently initi-
ating a legal proceeding because of the uniqueness of the abortion
decision.2 73
Arguments analogous to those made by the plaintiffs in Bellotti
can be made on behalf of foster children seeking to establish the right
262 Id. at 643.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 640-41, 648.
266 Id. at 643.
267 Id. at 642.
268 Id. at 643.
269 Id. at 642.
270 Id. at 643.
271 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
272 Id. at 643-44 (citations omitted).
273 Id. at 643.
1236 [Vol. 79:1200
1994] NOTE-EMPOWERING CHILDREIN 1237
to independently initiate termination proceedings. The unique na-
ture and consequences of a foster child's decision to pursue termina-
tion also justifies an exception to procedural limitations traditionally
imposed upon minors. 274 If foster children are denied access to the
court because of procedural restrictions that require them to rely on
inadequate and incompetent state officials to secure their constitu-
tional rights,275 then such procedural requirements constitute undue
restrictions on the exercise of those children's constitutional rights.
Denying a foster child direct access to the judiciary, where a determi-
nation can be made that parental rights termination is in his best in-
terests, erects a procedural limitation that is the equivalent of an
"absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"276 of that child's fundamental
right to an enduring family relationship.
b. The Rights of Natural Parents and Foster Children Are Not
Mutually Exclusive
To attain the right to initiate parental rights termination pro-
ceedings, foster children will have to assert that granting them this
right will not unduly impinge on the constitutional rights of their nat-
274 The Bellotti Court noted that "the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to ac-
count for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern ... sympathy, and...
paternal attention.'" 443 U.S. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971). These needs, however, are not addressed by denying direct court access to foster
children who wish to initiate termination proceedings and secure their fundamental rights.
Indeed, the opposite is true: by allowing children to freely be heard by the judiciary, these
foster children may actually be able to have their needs for concern, sympathy and pater-
nal attention met by a new, adoptive family.
The Court also noted that "the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors." Id. at 637. This justification is
clearly not applicable, in that initiating termination proceedings aims only to put before a
disinterested judge the question of whether the child's biological parents in reality play
this "guiding role" to any extent.
The decision to terminate a parent's right is made by a court, not the child petitioner.
Although some argue that the decision to initiate a termination proceeding may be psycho-
logically damaging, see supra part II.B., the truly "important, affirmative choice with poten-
tially serious consequences" at issue is the decision to terminate.
Similarly, in Bellotti the important decision was not whether to seek parental consent
or judicial authorization for the abortion, but rather, whether to have the abortion. In
Bellott4 the Court held that judicial authorization of a minor's desire to have an abortion
was permissible in cases where the child was mature and her decision was well informed,
or, in cases where the minor was not capable of making an independent decision but the
her desire for an abortion was consistent with her best interests. Id. at 643-44. The same
reasoning could be applied in situations where a child comes before a court and indicates
that she wishes to terminate the rights of her natural parents. The court will only be in-
clined to grant the child's wish if doing so is in her best interests. Because the court is
responsible for the ultimate decision to terminate, there is no danger that the child's lack
of experience, perspective or judgment will result in an inappropriate or detrimental
termination.
275 See supra part I.B.3.
276 Belotti, 443 U.S. at 644.
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ural parents or other parties. Protecting the rights of natural parents
seemed to concern the Smith majority, which emphasized that grant-
ing the procedural protections requested by the plaintiff foster par-
ents would involve "derogating from the substantive liberty" of the
natural parents.277 The Court found it difficult to reconcile the abso-
lute rights of natural parents with the liberty interest asserted by the
foster parents. Accordingly, the Court noted the difficulty of acquir-
ing a liberty interest "in the face of another's constitutionally recog-
nized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law
sanction, and basic human right."278
Granting foster children the right to initiate termination pro-
ceedings arguably would not infringe upon the rights of natural par-
ents because the same mechanisms that currently protect the liberty
interests of parents involved in state-initiated termination proceedings
would also be in place in cases involving child petitioners. 279 Further-
more, a child petitioner could distinguish Smith, which pitted the
rights of biological parents against the rights of foster parents, by ar-
guing that in a child-initiated termination proceeding the rights of the
child and natural parent must be balanced. Both parties have an equal
liberty interest deriving from both the blood relationship and basic
human rights. At some point the right of a foster child to a perma-
nent and happy home must outweigh the right of the natural parent
to maintain legal ties with the child.280
Recognition of a foster child's right to assert liberty and property
interests may overcome state procedural obstacles that effectively deny
the child the power to influence decisions about family matters. Smith
does not resolve whether a foster child has a fundamental right to
permanence or whether foster parents have valid Fourteenth Amend-
ment interests in the child's placement.28' Lower federal courts have
consistently rejected arguments that foster families have such inter-
ests.282 Judges may commiserate with the problems faced by those in-
277 Smith v, OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977).
278 Id.
279 See LEGAL ISSUES IN FoSTER CARE, supra note 66, at 31-34 (discussing higher proce-
dural standards in termination proceedings which are due to "the gravity of... [the] depri-
vation and the stigma of being found unfit.").
280 See supra part II.D.
281 See Musewicz, supra note 72, at 665-66.
282 In Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978), the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the foster parents' arguments for protected liberty and property interests
in adopting their foster child. Id. at 1206-08. In Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 604-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), the district court held that neither Title IV of the Social Security Act nor
the New York Social Services Law creates an enforceable property interest in a permanent,
stable home for foster children. Id. at 603. The same court rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment property claims of foster parent plaintiffs in Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
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volved in the foster care system,283 but they generally adhere to the
judicial philosophy that it is not the courts' role to solve those
problems.28 4
Despite these difficulties, foster children may secure the right to
initiate termination proceedings by first asserting a constitutionally
protected interest in permanence and then assailing procedural inad-
equacies that impinge upon that interest.
4. The Federal Constitution: A Weak Foundation for a Foster Child's
Right to Initiate Termination Proceedings
Although advocates can advance some creative arguments using
Smith and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
federal Constitution does not offer a dependable foundation for the
right to initiate termination proceedings. The current Supreme
Court is unlikely to discover such a right within the four comers of the
Constitution.28 5 Reform will most likely come, if at all, from the
legislatures.28 6
B. Federal Statutes: The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980
The state and local governments of the United States historically
provided services for children.28 7 In 1909, however, the federal gov-
ernment held the first White House Conference on Children and es-
tablished the Children's Bureau, thus making the welfare of children
a legitimate national concem. 288 The federal government's role in
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The court found no merit in the argument that the
realities of the New York foster care system justified the foster parents' expectation that
their role would not be abruptly and summarily terminated. Id. at 280-81. Although the
Supreme Court reversed Dumpson in Smith, it did not consider the property interest argu-
ment because plaintiffs failed to renew this argument after it was rejected by the district
court. Smith, 431 U.S. at 839.
283 The Smith Court noted that "there are elements of truth" in the foster parents'
portrayal of "a foster-care system in which children neglected by their parents and con-
demned to a permanent limbo of foster care are arbitrarily shunted about by social work-
ers whenever they become attached to a foster home." 431 U.S. at 838 n.41.
284 For example, the Smith majority considered only the procedural issues present in
the case and stated that "[a]rguments asserting the need for reform of NewYork's statutory
scheme are properly addressed to the New York Legislature." Id. at 838.
285 The election of President Clinton has raised hopes that future changes in the com-
position of the Supreme Court will lead to increased recognition of children's constitu-
tional rights to standing. Perhaps the influence of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who is strongly
committed to children's rights, will have an impact. See generally, Rodham, supra note 37, at
487-88 (arguing for the extension of more adult rights to children and increased recogni-
tion of children's unique needs and interests in the form of enforceable rights).
286 See infra parts II.D.-E. (discussing state constitutions and statutes).
287 KNrrZER & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 105.
288 Id.
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providing adequate children's services has gradually expanded since
the 1930S.289
Interest in national family policy has increased over the past de-
cades, and today federal government action and inaction greatly influ-
ences the quality of family life.290 Despite concern for the American
family, however, federal statutes have not provided fertile ground for
the expansion of children's rights. The shortcomings of the main fed-
eral law governing child welfare practices, the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA),291 illustrate the failure of
federal statutory law to provide for such expansion. As currently inter-
preted and applied, the AACWA, like other federal statutes, fails to
provide a basis for giving foster children the right to sue for termina-
tion of natural parental rights.
1. Provisions Under the AACWA
Congress enacted the AACWA to reduce unnecessary and un-
planned foster care by encouraging permanency planning for abused
and neglected children.292 The Act offers fiscal incentives for states to
adopt its substantive reforms.293 Among these substantive reforms are
the AACWA requirements that a child may be placed in foster care
only after a judicial determination that the state welfare agency has
made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child, and that
289 Id. at 105. Knitzer and Allen provide an overview and evaluation of major federal
programs enacted which seek to promote child welfare, strengthen the juvenile justice
system, provide social services to children, and address the special needs of children and
children with disabilities. Id. at 107-150.
290 See id.
291 Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 1994)); see also Mary Lee Allen et al., A Guide to the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE CouRTS 575-79 (Mark Hardin ed.,
1983).
292 See PELTON, supra note 51, at 54, 79.
293 The Act ties receipt of particular funds to a state's adherence to particular substan-
tive provisions. Only state plans approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
qualify for payment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 622(a), 671(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992). This provision
has been described as follows:
Title IV-E of the AACWA [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 670-676 (West 1991 & Supp.
1994)] governs the receipt of federal matching funds for maintenance of
children in foster care and certain administrative costs. Most of the sub-
stantive requirements of the Act must be met to qualify for Title IV-E
payments.
Funding for services to children and their families comes under a dif-
ferent part of the AACWA, Title IV-B of the Social Security Act. To qualify
for certain funds under Title IV-B, states must satisfy substantive require-
ments of the act which overlap only in part with Title IV-E requirements. In
addition, certain requirements of the act are tied to the receipt of foster
care payments for voluntary foster care and the transfer of certain unused
foster care maintenance matching funds to child welfare services.
Hardin & Shalleck, supra note 63, at 379 (footnotes omitted).
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where removal is necessary, the child must be returned to and re-
united with her family as soon as possible.294
Once a child is in foster care, the Act mandates procedures to
facilitate permanency for the child. For example, the state must de-
velop a case plan that details problems, goals, necessary tasks and
timetables for the child's return to her home or permanent place-
ment.295 At least every six months, a court or administrative body
must conduct a case review, evaluating the effectiveness of the case
plan and the necessity for and appropriateness of the child's contin-
ued placement in foster care.296 Finally, the AACWA requires a dispo-
sitional hearing before a court-approved body within eighteen months
of placement to determine the future status of the child.
297
2. Shortcomings of the AACWA as a Basis for a Child's Right to
Initiate Termination Proceedings
Despite the broad provisions and initial promise of the Act,298 it
has provided only limited benefits. Two serious shortcomings prevent
the AACWA from effectively reforming the foster care system: first, it
fails to provide its beneficiaries with rudimentary procedural protec-
tions; second, as currently interpreted, the Act confers neither en-
forceable civil rights nor a private cause of action upon foster
children. These shortcomings limit the ability of the AACWA to effec-
tuate the intended reform of Congress. Consequently, the Act is an
inadequate foundation upon which to base a foster child's right to
initiate termination proceedings. These two shortcomings will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in the following subsections.
a. The AACWA 's Lack of Procedural Protection for Foster Children
While the AACWA provides for judicial oversight of a foster
child's placement, 299 it does not grant children procedural protec-
tions in these proceedings.300 For example, the Act does not specify
294 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a) (15), 672(a)(1) (1988).
295 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 (a) (16), 675(1) (1988).
296 42 U.S.C. §§ 627(a)(2)(B), 675(5)(A), (B) (1988).
297 42 U.S.C. §§ 627(a)(2)(B), 675(5)(C) (1988). The court or administrative body
may decide that the child should be returned home, placed for adoption, or kept in the
foster care system, either permanently or on a short term basis. Should the child remain in
foster care, these decisionmaking hearings must continue periodically. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(C) (1988).
298 At its inception, commentators predicted that the AACWA would "have a dramatic
effect on the operation of child welfare systems through the country." Allen et al., supra
note 291, at 576.
299 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
300 Note, however, that the Act provides natural parents with procedural protections.
For example, it dictates that "safeguards shall also be applied with respect to parental
rights pertaining to the removal of the child from the home of his parents, to a change in
the child's placement, and to any determination affecting the privileges of parents." 42
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who may participate in the eighteen month hearing and six month
review, nor does it establish the procedures for these required reviews.
The Act only guarantees the right of natural parents to participate in
the proceedings, and for six month reviews, participation is guaran-
teed only when such reviews are held before an administrative
panel.30' The Act does not guarantee participation on the part of the
child, the child's guardian ad litem, the foster parents or other
caretakers. 302
The Act does not support a child's right to participate in, let
alone initiate, termination proceedings. Nevertheless, the AACWA
should, at a minimum, guarantee the participation of all persons in-
volved in the child's placement. It is illogical to enact legislation to
promote the welfare of children and to then leave them unrepre-
sented in the review process. Indeed, one critic noted that "[u]nless
all affected parties have access to the process and are guaranteed that
it is a fair and meaningful one, there is little reason to believe the
review will produce anything but counterproductive animosity."30 3
b. The AAWCA's Unavailability as a Source of Substantive Rights
Initially, commentators assumed that the AACWA would "provide
fertile ground for ... affirmative litigation to effectuate system-wide
change."30 4 A recent Supreme Court decision, Suter v. Artist M.,30 5
however, has proven these commentators wrong. In Suter, child bene-
ficiaries of the Act filed a class action suit alleging that the Illinois
child welfare agency had failed to make "reasonable efforts" to pre-
serve and reunite families, in contravention of section 671(a) (15) of
the AACWA. The district court and court of appeals306 held that the
Act contained an implied cause of action under Title 42 of the United
U.S.C. § 675(5) (C) (1988). The AACWA does not specify, however, the procedures
through which officials are to notify parents and give them the opportunity to challenge
agency decisions. The AACWA does provide persons denied benefits under the Act with a
fair hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (12) (1988). The Act does not clarify what procedures
would apply to such hearings. See Hardin & Shalleck, supra note 63, at 379 (discussing the
elements of a fair hearing under the AACWA); see also Abigail English, Litigation Under the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 612,
627-28 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (discussing due process elements of fair hearings under
general social welfare provisions).
301 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (B) & (6) (1988).
302 See Musewicz, supra note 72, at 735 n.420.
303 Id. at 735.
304 English, supra note 300, at 613. See also Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost Generation': The
Battlefor Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 60 U. CIN.
L. REv. 593, 637 (arguing that private enforcement of the AACWA's requirements through
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) is necessary to make the Act an effective
tool for achieving foster care reform).
305 Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
306 Artist M. v.Johnson, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'g 726 F. Supp. 690 (N.D.Ill.
1989).
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States Code, section 1983.307 The Supreme Court concluded, how-
ever, that section 671 (a) (15) neither confers rights enforceable under
section 1983 nor implies a private cause of action. Section 1983, the
Court stated, "is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute
'where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the
enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable
rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983.' "308
The Court held that Congress did not "unambiguously confer upon
the child beneficiaries of the Act the right to enforce the. . . 'reason-
able efforts' "requirement. 30 9 Legislative history, the Court indicated,
left a great deal of discretion to the states to meet the "reasonable
efforts" requirement.310 Additionally, the Court noted that because
other sections of the Act provide mechanisms for the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to enforce the "reasonable efforts" clause,
the absence of a section 1983 remedy does not render the clause
meaningless.31' According to the Court, the regulations under the
Act were not specific and did not indicate that the state's failure to do
anything other than submit an acceptance plan would deny it federal
funds.312
The Court's ruling in Suter indicates that the AACWA will not sup-
port private actions challenging state-imposed impediments to foster
care reform, even if those impediments violate the Act's purpose of
securing permanence for foster children. Foster children thus cannot
use the Act as a sword to challenge restrictions on their right to initi-
ate termination proceedings.
3. Federal Statutes Need to Be Improved & Amended
The Court's restrictive reading of the AACWA means that, in its
current form, the Act provides no basis for a foster child to sue for
termination. Recently, Congress formally reported on the AACWA's
307 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988).
308 Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1366 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). The weakness of the Court's decision can be seen in the
circularity of its reasoning: Section 1983 does not vindicate rights not recognized by sec-
tion 1983.
309 Id. at 1367-68.
310 Id. at 1369.
311 Id. The Court acknowledges that these enforcement provisions "may not provide a
comprehensive mechanism so as to manifest Congress' intent to foreclose remedies under
§ 1983." Id. at 1368. It notes, however, that it need not consider the foreclosure issue due
to its conclusion that the AACWA does not create the enforceable rights asserted by the
foster children. Id. at n.ll. SeeAtwell, supra note 304, at 647 ("It is disturbing.., that the
Court seems satisfied that section 1983 is not necessary as long as its absence does not
render the statute a dead letter. While the lack of a section 1983 claim may not make the
reasonable efforts provision a dead letter, it may terminally weaken it.").
312 Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1369.
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many shortcomings.31 Congress heard testimony from child welfare
experts that the Act "could be strengthened to include greater proce-
dural protections to children in the foster care/child welfare sys-
tem"31 4 and that it specifically should provide the child with a private
cause of action. 315 Child advocates must lobby for new federal legisla-
tion that explicitly grants foster children further procedural rights,
such as the right to initiate termination proceedings.
C. The Kingsley Decision: Criticisms and Distinctions
The denial of Gregory Kingsley's right to initiate termination pro-
ceedings by the Florida appeals court establishes an undesirable pre-
cedent in Florida, and non-binding persuasive authority in other
states. Several aspects of the appellate court's decision in Kingsley v.
Kingsley make it ripe for reversal by the Florida Supreme Court or
should at least deflate its persuasive value in other jurisdictions.
These arguments are set forth in the following subsections.
1. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(b)
First, the appellate court's holding misconstrues Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.210(b). Analyzing this rule, the court concluded
that a guardian ad litem or next friend must represent a child in a
legal proceeding in order to ensure "the orderly administration ofjus-
tice and the procedural protection of a minor's welfare and interest
by the court."3 16 Rule 1.210(b), however, states that:
When an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as
a guardian or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or de-
fend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or
incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed represen-
tative may sue by next friend or by guardian ad litem. The court
shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent per-
son not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other
order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent
person.3 17
The statute does not require representation by a guardian ad litem or
next friend. Instead, such representation is optional, and the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem or next friend is discretionary.318 When a
313 DISCARDED CHILDREN, supra note 3, at 55-58.
314 Id. at 57 (summarizing testimony of Mark Hardin, Esq. and Anita Weinberg, Esq.).
315 Id. at 58.
316 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
317 FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.210(b) (emphasis added).
318 Rule 1.210(b) is interpreted by the Florida courts in the same manner as its identi-
cal federal counterpart. See FED. R. Crv. P. 17(c); see also Smith v. Langford, 255 So. 2d 294,
297 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1971). The "[a] ppointment of a guardian ad litem is considered to
be discretionary under the Federal Rules, provided the ... [c]ourt enters a finding that the
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minor comes before the court with a competent attorney to represent
her, it would be superfluous to require that child to be represented by
a guardian ad litem.319
2. Florida Case Law: Smith v. Langford
Second, the appellate court failed to address fully the holding sei
forth in an earlier case, Smith v. Langford.3 20 Langford involved a mi-
nor plaintiff seeking a 'Judicial determination that [the] defendant
[was] the father of her unborn child."3 21 After the circuit court dis-
missed the complaint without prejudice, plaintiff appealed the deci-
sion.322 On appeal, the court noted that "a suit may be brought by or
against an infant in his individual capacity,"3 23 and that "it is not nec-
essary in all cases that a guardian ad litem or next friend be appointed
to represent him in the action. '3 24 According to Langford, when it
becomes apparent to a court that one of the parties to an action is a
minor, it is
essential that the court.., consider whether an appointment of a
legal representative for the infant should be made. If, however, the
court is of the opinion that the interest of the minor will be fully
protected throughout the action and in its final disposition without
the necessity of appointing a legal representative to act for the mi-
nor, then the appointment of such a representative may be dis-
pensed with.325
In so holding, the court leaves open the possibility of ajuvenile party
appearing without the assistance of a guardian ad litem or next friend.
In reaching its final decision, the Langford court found that the
trial court had erred in refusing to proceed further merely because
interests of the minor are adequately protected in the event it does not make such appoint-
ment." M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9,
11-12 (6th Cir. 1974); Jacobs v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 603-04 (7th Cir.
1973), vacated as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975); Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35,"
39 (5th Cir. 1958)).
319 For example, in Westcott v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., the court of appeals
held that the failure of the trial court to grant a motion for a guardian ad litem for a minor
defendant was not reversible error in part because an able attorney had already been em-
ployed to represent the minor, and in part because the motion was to obtain a jury trial.
158 F.2d 20, 20 (4th Cir. 1946).
320 Langrord, 255 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
321 Id. at 295.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 297 (interpreting Rule 1.210(b) in the same manner as its identical federal
counterpart, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), and adopting the views espoused by
Kooman in FEDERAL CWM PRACrncE 385, Vol. 2 (1970 ed.)).
324 Id.
325 Id. at 297-98.
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the plaintiff was a minor.3 26 Upon learning of plaintiff's juvenile
status,
the trial court should have considered whether, in view of the na-
ture of this action and the circumstances of the case, it was neces-
sary for the suit to be brought and maintained by a guardian ad
litem or next friend for the use and benefit of the minor plaintiff; if
so, it should then have proceeded to appoint a guardian ad litem
for plaintiff or permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint by bring-
ing the action in her name by her mother as next friend. 327
Thus, in Gregory's case, the court should have considered
whether Gregory's youth, in light of the circumstances, made it neces-
sary for a guardian ad litem or next friend to bring the suit on his
behalf. Instead, the court announced a blanket rule that all minors
who wish to initiate a parental rights termination proceeding must do
so through a guardian ad litem or next friend. If the court had
looked to the circumstances surrounding Gregory's case, the judges
easily could have found that his representation byJerri Blair provided
him with adequate protection during the termination proceeding. In-
deed, the appellate court conceded that Gregory's attorney could
have filed a termination petition on Gregory's behalf-but only if she
acted as his "next friend" rather than as his attorney.3 28 Even though
Gregory would have been the real party in interest under the "attor-
ney as next friend" approach, the court indicated that this "long-rec-
ognized and well-tested procedure" 329 fulfilled the requirement that
"an adult person of reasonable judgment and integrity conduct the
litigation for the minor."330
The Florida appellate court asserted that the next friend require-
ment is "necessary for the orderly conduct ofjudicial proceedings,"331
but did not clarify how this requirement is more effective in further-
ing judicial order than rules that govern the actions of attorneys not
wearing the "next friend" label. The law already prohibits an attorney
from filing frivolous claims, and attorneys, even those not acting as
next friends, are required to be "person [s] of reasonable judgment
and integrity"3 32 who will promote the "orderly conduct of judicial
proceedings." 333
326 Id. at 298.
327 Id.
328 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
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3. The Guardian Ad Litem and the Next Friend: Uncertain Roles
A third area of criticism is the appellate court's failure to deline-
ate the roles that next friends and guardians ad litem should play in
termination proceedings. The appellate court did not address the
"question of whether the next friend has any function in the proceed-
ings after the petition has been filed and an appropriate guardian ad
litem has been appointed by the court."334 Although the court
claimed that this question was not raised in Gregory's case, its failure
to address this issue makes it unclear what responsibilities an attorney
may or must undertake when acting as a foster child's next friend in a
termination proceeding. The court also suggested that even in situa-
tions where an attorney is acting as the child's next friend, a guardian
ad litem must be appointed to represent the child in the actual pro-
ceeding. Thus, the court implied that Gregory's attorney, acting as his
next friend, should have filed a termination petition on his behalf and
then stepped aside, allowing a court-appointed guardian ad litem to
represent him in the actual termination proceeding. If this is the
case, it is not clear how the next friend requirement serves to further
the judicial process any more than if a child were to initiate a proceed-
ing on her own or with the help of her attorney. Indeed, it is hard to
discern how a next friend promotes the "orderly conduct of judicial
proceedings"33 5 if her role in the actual proceeding is, in all likeli-
hood, non-existent.33 6
4. Procedural Impediments That Unduly Burden a Foster Child's
Substantive Rights
The Florida appellate court's reasoning is flawed in its assertion
that "Gregory's lack of capacity due to nonage is a procedural, not
substantive impediment which minimally restricts his right to partici-
pate as a party in proceedings brought to terminate the parental
rights of his natural parents." 3 37 By concluding that "this procedural
requirement does not unduly burden a child's fundamental liberty in-
terest to be 'free of physical and emotional violence at the hands of
-34 Id. at 784 n.8.
335 Id. at 784.
336 Indeed, it is unclear why the participation of attorneys acting as next friends should
be limited to the filing of petitions. It is difficult to conceive of a rationale for prohibiting
attorneys-even those bearing the next friend moniker-from representing and protect-
ing the child's interests in the actual termination proceeding. Standing alone, a procedure
that requires a next friend attorney to defer to a court-appointed guardian after the peti-
tion has been filed seems illogical. Given the sad state of the Florida welfare system and its
overburdened guardian ad litem program, what can justify requiring that guardians repre-
sent foster children in termination proceedings if next friend attorneys, who are already
familiar with the needs and wishes of the children, are available to do the job?
337 Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785.
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his ... most trusted caretaker,' "338 the opinion disregards the basic
facts of the case.at hand. This conclusion also ignores the enormous
limitations placed on children who wish to escape the limbo of foster
care.
Like foster children across the nation, Gregory's rights were se-
verely impaired by the underfunded and overburdened child welfare
system responsible for his well-being. The law guardian who was re-
sponsible for protecting his interests was unresponsive and the proce-
dures governing his journey through the foster care system were
routinely ignored by welfare workers and judges. The court that tried
Gregory's case presumed that the procedures erected to protect the
rights of foster children were working smoothly. This presumption
was unwarranted. By closing its eyes to the inadequacies of Florida's
child welfare system, the appellate court failed to recognize that deny-
ing foster children the right to initiate termination proceedings and
requiring them to rely upon ineffective guardians ad litem3 39 to pro-
tect their interests places an undue burden on their pursuit of funda-
mental rights.3 40
5. The Presumption of Incompetence: An Exception to the Rule
The fifth and most fundamental criticism of the Kingsley decision
responds to the appellate court's reliance on the "historic concept"341
that all children are presumptively incompetent and lack the capacity
coherently to petition a court for the protection of their basic rights.
The appellate court upheld the ban on direct court access for chil-
dren by falling back on an admittedly "arbitrary"3 42 rule to protect
against the judicial disorder that courts anticipate would ensue if chil-
dren were permitted to initiate termination proceedings.
In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court relied heavily on
Bellotti v. Baird.343 Quoting from Bellotti, the opinion asserted that the
Constitution allows states to "require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights indepen-
dently."344 This assertion was qualified in Bellotti by the Court's deter-
338 Id. The court notes that the procedural burden that it is placing on foster children
is "only marginally greater than the burden on an adult...." Id. at 784.
339 The United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect reports that
"[t] raditionally, attorneys involved in child protectivejudicial proceedings have been inade-
quately trained and compensated... [and that] [d]espite the increasing legal complexity of
these cases, too often the affected children are not receiving independent legal counsel.").
CRrc:AL Frsr STEps, supra note 5, at 88.
340 See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785 (citing the objective criteria set forth in Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
341 Id. at 783.
342 Id.
343 443 U.S. 622 (1979). See also supra notes 258-76 and accompanying text.
344 Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784.
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mination that, because of "the peculiar nature of the abortion
decision,"3 45 the general rule prohibiting minors from directly acces-
sing the judicial system did not apply. Indeed, Bellotti held that a preg-
nant minor must be afforded "an opportunity to receive an
independentjudicial determination that she is mature enough to con-
sent or that an abortion would be in her best interests."3 46
The Kingsley court could have held that foster children seeking to
initiate termination proceedings are similarly exempt from the gen-
eral rule. As in the case of an abortion decision, a foster child's deci-
sion to pursue termination is unique in nature and consequence.3 47
Given the fact that pursuing termination is often a child's only means
of securing an enduring family relationship, the Kingsley court should
have concluded that without the opportunity to directly access the
court, a foster child's constitutional rights are unduly burdened.3 48
D. State Constitutions
Like the Florida appellate court, courts of other states may be
reluctant to abandon the notion that children are incapable of initiat-
ing any type of legal action. The rights guaranteed to foster children
under federal law are quite limited. There is, however, a third source
of rights for foster children. In states where the climate is favorable
for recognizing new children's rights, state constitutions may provide
a basis for establishing a foster child's right to initiate a termination
proceeding.
1. Privacy Rights Guaranteed by State Constitutions
A particular state's constitution may be interpreted to supple-
ment the minimal rights afforded under federal law. For example, at
the trial level, Gregory Kingsley successfully argued that the general
right to make private choices about living arrangements required rec-
ognition of his right to initiate a termination proceeding.3 49 The pri-
vacy right, the Florida circuit court held, flowed from Article I of the
Florida Constitution.3 0 Article I guaranteed Gregory the right to pur-
sue happiness, 35' the right to due process of law,3 52 the right of access
345 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 n.23.
346 Id. at 651.
347 See infra notes 354-402 and accompanying text.
348 Id.
349 Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct.July 20, 1992)
(order on standing), rev'd sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
350 Id.
351 FLA. CONsr. art. I, § 2.
352 Id. art. I, § 9.
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to the courts of the state,353 and the right to make private choices.3 54
Judge Kirk affirmed that the right to privacy set forth in the Florida
Constitution3 55 extends to all natural persons, including minors.3 56
Quoting the Florida Supreme Court decision In re T.W 3 5 7 and a
United States Supreme Court case, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,358
Judge Kirk explained that "[c] onstitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state defined age
of majority."3 59
Many state constitutional provisions grant broader rights than
those provided by the federal equivalent. In some states, for instance,
the right to privacy is clearly expressed in the constitution.3 60 Other
states, whose constitutions do not specifically enumerate a right to pri-
vacy, have implied such a right.361 In those jurisdictions that recog-
nize a state constitutional right to privacy, children should have the
right to initiate and participate directly in proceedings that involve
private choices about their familial affiliation. As in Gregory K, how-
ever, states must recognize that minors are "persons" in order for fos-
ter children to persuade a court that the "freedom of personal choice
in matters of... family life"3 62 is a protected liberty interest under the
right to privacy embodied in their state constitutions.3 63
353 Id. art. I, § 21.
354 Id. art. I, § 23.
355 Id. This provision guarantees that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life." Id.
356 Gregory K, No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488.
357 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989).
358 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
359 Gregory K, No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488. In In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191,
Florida's highest court observed that the "Supreme Court has recognized a privacy right
that shields an individual's autonomy in deciding matters concerning marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Noting that
the United States Supreme Court "has made it clear that the states, not the federal govern-
ment, are the final guarantors of personal privacy," the court held that the Florida Consti-
tution "embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual...
than does the federal Constitution." Id. at 1191-92.
360 The California Constitution, for example, states that: "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and ob-
taining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. Similarly, the Arizona Cbn-
stitution provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs... without
authority of law." ARIz. CONsT. art. II, § 8. See, e.g., ALAsKA CONSr. art. 1, § 22; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 23; HAw. CONsT. art. 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; Mor.
CONsr. art. II, § 10; WASH. CONSr. art. I, § 7.
361 Despite the lack of an explicit right to privacy in the Massachusetts Constitution,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that unity and privacy of family are
entitled to constitutional protection. See Adoption of a Minor, 438 N.E.2d 38, 45 (Mass.
1982).
362 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
363 Gregory K, No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488.
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Arguments addressing children's status as "persons" should be
tailored to fit the constitutional language of the state in which the
claim is being brought. A state constitution's express recognition of
privacy rights makes it easier to maintain that the right to petition for
parental rights termination is constitutionally protected. When the
right to privacy is not specifically set forth in a state constitution, fos-
ter children should attempt to have such a right recognized by the
judiciary.
2. Undue Burdens on a Foster Child's State Constitutional Rights
Additionally, as the Kingsley decision indicates, foster children
must demonstrate more than just a constitutional right to make deci-
sions regarding their familial relationships. Foster children must also
establish that the procedural limitations on their rights are unduly
burdensome and constitutionally impermissible. 364 The Supreme
Court decision of Bellotti v. Baird65 held that states could not impose
undue burdens on a minor's exercise of her fundamental rights.366
Forcing foster children to rely on inadequate child welfare systems to
initiate termination proceedings on their behalf severely burdens the
constitutional rights of those foster children.
In states that guard privacy rights more zealously than the
Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional mandates, an advo-
cate could contend that state statutes limiting a foster child's ability to
make choices regarding her familial relationships should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. In Florida, for example, a statute that impinges
on a minor's constitutional rights must survive a "stringent test."3 67
Under such a test, when a statute implicates the right to privacy, "the
state must prove that the statute furthers a compelling state interest
through the least intrusive means."368
It is unclear what would constitute a compelling-rather than
merely "significant"369-state interest in limiting a minor's ability to
initiate a termination proceeding. A state might assert that such a
limitation furthers the state's interest in protecting immature minors.
A state might also assert, as did the appellate court in Kingsley, that
364 See supra parts III.A. & III.C. (discussing the argument, suggested by Bellotti v. Baird,
that denying foster children direct access to the judicial system constitutes an undue bur-
den upon their constitutional rights).
365 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
366 Id. at 640, 643 n.23.
367 In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
368 Id. (citing the test enumerated in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477
So. 2d 544 (Ha. 1985)).
369 At the federal level, intrusive statutes need only further a "significant," not a com-
pelling, state interest. Id. at 1194-95 n.8.
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denying foster children direct court access is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.
These might be worthy objectives, but they are not compelling
state interests. Indeed, procedural limitations on foster children's ac-
cess to the courts do nothing to further such objectives. Even if such
interests could be characterized as "compelling," denying foster chil-
dren direct court access is not the "least intrusive means" of protect-
ing these interests. States that want to protect minors can do so by
ensuring that they are provided with effective counsel during the
course of the termination proceeding. Similarly, states concerned
about large numbers of frivolous termination suits being brought di-
rectly by minors can apply pre-existing procedural mechanisms that
effectively prevent or diminish these potential problems.3 7 0 These are
just two mechanisms that promote state interests without unduly in-
truding upon a foster child's right to impact decisions regarding his
familial relationships.
E. State Statutes
A foster child's right to initiate termination proceedings can also
be rooted in state statutes. In Gregory K, the Florida circuit court rec-
ognized Gregory's right to sue for parental rights termination under
Florida statutory law. 37 ' Because Gregory was a person with know-
ledge of facts that could form the basis of a claim, the court con-
cluded that he had the right to file a petition under the Florida
statutes. 372 Similar arguments can be made in those states with com-
parably broad statutory language.373
370 See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 11 ("By presenting to the court.., a pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances... [that] it is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or cause unnecessary delay... [and] that the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument."); MODEL RuLEs OF
PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.").
371 Gregoy K, No. CI92-5127, 1992 WL 551488.
372 Chapter 39.001(a) of the Florida Statutes provides forjudicial and nonjudicial pro-
ceedings whereby children and other interested parties can receive fair hearings and rec-
ognition, protection, and enforcement of their constitutional rights. Chapter 39.461 of
the Florida Statutes states that "any... person who has knowledge of the facts alleged" may
file a petition for termination of parental rights.
373 In Tennessee, for example, a state law provides that a petition for termination "may
be made by any person . . . who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed and
believes that they are true." TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-119 (1993). Likewise South Carolina
provides that "[a] petition seeking termination of parental rights may be filed by the child
protective services agency or any interested party." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1564 (Law Co-
op. 1984). Indeed, the child whose ties are being severed is probably the party most inter-
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Children asserting the right to initiate termination proceedings
on the basis of state statutory provisions must tailor their arguments to
conform with their state's specific statutory language. Where statutes
fail to include specific language or standards specifying who may initi-
ate termination proceedings, 74 the success of a standing argument
may be less predictable. The Texas Code, for example, fails to pro-
vide who may file a termination petition.3 75 One Texas court denied
standing to foster parents who filed a termination petition in order to
facilitate the adoption of their foster child.3 76 Therefore, it appears
that a statutory argument for the right of foster children to initiate
termination proceedings in Texas will succeed only if either the stat-
ute is amended or litigants persuade the courts that foster children
warrant an exception to the general rule prohibiting minors from di-
rectly accessing the judicial system.37 7 In states like Texas, where the
statutory standards are vague, child advocates should lobby state legis-
lators and persuade them to replace vague language with explicit
guarantees of foster children's rights.
The statutes of some states clearly preclude interpretations favor-
ing foster children's rights.378 For example, an Illinois statute allows
parental termination petitions to be filed only by adult persons, agen-
cies, associations, or guardians ad litem.37 9 This statute leaves little
room for an interpretation that a child may independently file a peti-
tion, except through an undue procedural burden argument as per
Bellotti v. Baird. Additionally, Virginia's courts will not accept a termi-
nation petition unless the child welfare agency with custody of the
child presents the court with a foster care plan recommending termi-
ested in such a proceeding. See also ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (1993) (petition for termina-
tion proceeding may be made); IOWA CODE § 232.111.2 (1992) (department of human
services, juvenile court officer, county attorney or judge can authorize any competent per-
son having knowledge of the circumstances to file a petition); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-
105(1) (1993) (any person, agency or institution may file a petition); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
7-1564 (Law. Co-op. 1991); WASH REV. CODE § 13.34.180 (1991) (any party to a depen-
dency hearing may file a petition).
374 See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-82 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1582 (1986); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 533-A (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-291 (1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 112 (McKinney 1993);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7 (1992).
375 TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. § 15.02 (1986).
376 Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. 1982) (affirming decision that de-
nied foster parents the right to intervene in a termination suit by the Department of Social
Services or to bring an independent termination suit).
377 See supra part III.C. (suggesting possible arguments justifying a foster child's right
to initiate termination proceedings).
378 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715(a) (1993 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 1104 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para 803-15 (1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.-CH. C.
art. 1004 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3f-104 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. § 48.42 (West
1987).
379 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para 803-15 (1989).
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nation as in the best interests of the child.38 0 Thus, under Virginia
law, Gregory would have been denied standing because the state wel-
fare agency did not recommend termination until after Gregory initi-
ated the proceeding. Child advocates in these states must actively
lobby for statutory standards that permit foster children to petition for
termination.
IV
A FOSTER CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: ExAMINING THE
FEDERAL, STATE AND COMMON LAW ALTERNATIVES
Foster children can take advantage of the right to initiate termi-
nation proceedings only if they are represented by effective counsel.
Legal representation assists foster children in filing termination peti-
tions and is crucial to a successful argument for the enforcement of
their rights.
A. The Guardian Ad Litem: Ineffective Counsel for Foster
Children Seeking to Initiate Termination Proceedings
In almost every state, abused or neglected children have the right
to a court-appointed attorney, often called a "guardian ad litem."381
This attorney acts independently to protect the child's interests in the
formal adjudication and dispositional stages of the litigation.38 2 Yet,
in post-dispositional case review hearings, such as separate proceed-
ings seeking termination of parental rights, "state statutes and appel-
late courts rarely require-and thus children are much less likely to
have-court-appointed representation."38 3 Thus, it is difficult to ar-
gue that children initiating termination proceedings should be guar-
anteed representation by effective counsel.
If a child is represented in a termination proceeding, it is usually
by a guardian ad litem. 38 4 Most states mandate that an attorney, act-
ing as a guardian ad litem, represent a foster child upon the state's
380 Stanley v. Fairfax County Dep't of Social Servs., 395 S.E.2d 199, 202 (Va. Ct. App.
1990), aff'd, 405 S.E.2d 621 (Va. 1991).
381 Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Represented inJudicial Proceed-
ings, 18 PEP?. L. REv. 255, 268 (1991). Davidson notes that
[a] primary impetus for such laws was not a Supreme Court decision, but
rather the 1974 federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act...
[which] requires that states receiving certain federal assistance for child pro-
tective services assure that every child involved in a civil child protective
proceeding has a court-appointed guardian ad litem.
Id.
382 Id. at 269.
383 Id. Davidson observes that "it seems odd and unfortunate that all states do not
clearly mandate appointment of counsel for the child in termination of parental rights
hearings, since the long-term consequences are greatest in these cases." Id.
384 Id. at 268-69.
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initiation of that child's removal from the home of her biological par-
ents. 3 5 While the duties of a guardian ad litem include representing
foster children in state-initiated adjudicatory hearings initiated by the
state, expanding the role of the guardian to include the representa-
tion of children in termination proceedings does not satisfy the re-
quirement of effective counsel. A guardian ad litem is prohibited
from adopting an adversarial position at adjudicatory hearings.38 6
Thus, the guardian may consider neither the child's parents nor the
state as an opponent.38 7 The guardian's role is to advocate what she
believes is in the "best interests" of the child,388 even if her conception
of the child's best interests does not coincide with the child's rea-
soned desires.3 9 Accordingly, "acting in the best interests of the child
and acting as the child's legal representative are quite different
matters."390
In a termination proceeding initiated by the state against a foster
child's natural parents, both the state and the natural parents attempt
to convince the judge that their position is in the "best interests of the
child."391 To balance the positions taken by these adversaries, the
guardian ad litem investigates the child's wishes, considers the possi-
ble options for the child, and then makes an independent recommen-
dation to the court as to whether termination should occur.392
Although the guardian ad litem may provide adequate represen-
tation for children in non-adversarial proceedings, the guardian is less
able to assist a child who adopts an adversarial posture toward his nat-
ural parents, and often toward the state as well, by initiating a termina-
tion proceeding.3 93 When the interests of the child are directly in
conflict with those of another party in the proceeding, "[t]he court
385 Id. at 269. A few states employ lay citizens as guardians, but guardians rarely repre-
sent children in abuse-related child custody disputes. Id. at 261-62.
386 GorrESMAN, supra note 73, at 50.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 The definition of the guardian's role presumes: (a) the correctness of the pater-
nalistic notion that the judicial process should give more weight to adult guardian's deter-
mination of the child's best interest than to the child's own wishes, and (b) that the scope
of the guardian's representation should be limited to proceedings involving the state and
the natural parents, but not the child, as adversaries.
390 NATIONAL COUNCIL OFJUV. & FAM. CT.JUDGES Er. AL., MAKING REASONABLE EFFoRTs:
STEPS FOR KEEPING FAMImES TOGETHER 31 (1987) [hereinafter MAKING REASONABLE
EFFORTS].
391 GoT-EsAN, supra note 73, at 50.
392 Id. at 50-52.
393 See Davidson, supra note 381, at 256.
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should... appoint a separate attorney for the child,"3 94 rather than a
guardian ad litem. 395
Assume, for example, that a guardian ad litem is assigned to rep-
resent a child who has been in foster care for six years and wishes to
file a termination petition with the court. Even if the child's petition
is not frivolous, the guardian cannot recommend termination to the
court if, in his opinion, termination is either too drastic a step or, for
some reason, not in the best interests of the child.396 Hindered from
recommending what her "client" seeks, the guardian ad litem cannot
provide the child with effective representation to establish a prima fa-
cie case for termination.3 97 Thus, a child represented only by a guard-
ian ad litem does not enjoy fully the right to have his views "freely
heard and fairly considered"398 by the judicial system. The child peti-
tioner in such a scenario is denied vigorous representation of her
objectives and her right to initiate termination proceedings may thus
be thwarted.
A more productive way to give effect to a child's right to initiate
termination proceedings would be to recognize the child's right to a
court-appointed, and independent, counsel. Children involved in ad-
versarial juvenile proceedings already enjoy such a right.3 99 An attor-
ney appointed to represent the child, but not acting as a guardian ad
litem, is less likely to inject her personal values into the proceeding.
After determining that her client's cause of action is not frivolous, the
attorney would present the case for termination in the best light possi-
ble. Representation by independent, court-appointed attorneys ob-
serving American Bar Association (ABA) standards of professional
responsibility400 would ensure effective advocacy of the child's views
394 MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS, supra note 390, at 31. See also STANDARDS RELATING
TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1980) (observing that "[i]ndependent counsel should
also be provided for the juvenile who is the subject of proceedings affecting his or her
status or custody"); Davidson, supra note 381, at 277 (noting that children need "independ-
ent advocacy in all types of proceedings where their interests may be affected").
395 See Davidson, supra note 381, at 277.
396 GoTTEsMAN, supra note 73, at 51-52.
397 Even if the guardian notifies the court of the child's wishes, subsequent recommen-
dations that are contrary to the child's wishes are likely to impede the court's action for
termination.
398 Davidson, supra note 381, at 255-56 (quoting language from Article 12 of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child).
399 See infra part W.B.; see also GoTrESMAN, supra note 73, at 22. Attorneys are provided
to juveniles in a variety of ways. In some states, the public defender's offices assign attor-
neys on a case-by-case basis, while in other states, the courts maintain rosters of qualified
attorneys and make assignments on a rotating basis. Id.
400 Davidson, supra note 381, at 262. The ABAjuvenilejustice Standards address areas
of concern specific to child clients. Id. These standards, however, should not be inter-
preted as restrictions on an attorney's representation of a child client. Davidson adds that
"[t]hese [s] tandards reject the use of attorneys as merely guardians ad litem entrusted with
protecting the child's 'best interests' ... [and] are, therefore oriented toward assuring that
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before the judge. In reaching a determination regarding termination,
the judge would therefore be able to consider the arguments for and
against termination offered by all affected parties: the state officials,
the natural parents and the child whose welfare is at stake. Although
this arrangement may complicate the decision-making process for the
judge, the interest of simplicity does not justify silencing a child's
voice in protecting her own fundamental rights.401
Representation by an independent, court-appointed attorney is
the best means of ensuring that foster children will be able to effec-
tively exercise their right to initiate termination proceedings.40 2 The
remainder of this section examines possible grounds in federal and
state law for establishing the right to independent, court-appointed
counsel in such proceedings.
B. Children's Right to Counsel: Limited Alternatives Under
Federal Law
1. Smith, Gault and Lassiter
The Supreme Court has not yet decided on whether children
have the right to counsel in termination proceedings. Moreover, the
Court's 1977 decision in Smith v. OFFER4 03 held that the failure to pro-
vide counsel for a child facing removal from a long-term foster home
did not by itself constitute a denial of due process. However, the
Supreme Court recognized the right to counsel forjuvenile crime sus-
pects in the 1967 case In re Gault.40 4 Noting the "awesome prospect of
incarceration," the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a child the right to be repre-
the child's own views concerning the case will be effectively heard in court through a law-
yer-advocate." Id.
401 In 1989 the ABA "adopted a policy stating that, in child abuse and neglect-related
judicial proceedings, all children should be represented by both a lay guardian ad litem ...
and an attorney acting as the child's legal counsel." Id. (emphasis omitted). Perhaps such
an arrangement would ensure zealous advocacy for the child, as well as a disinterested
opinion as to what decision would best serve the interests of the child. This arrangement
still presents the danger that a court will disregard the child's desires if they conflict with
the lay guardian's recommendation.
402 Foster children require more than mere representation by an independent attor-
ney. An attempt must also be made to ensure that such representation will be skillful and
diligent. Commenting on the proceedings for which legal representation is already re-
quired for children, a Congressional committee reported that "children... often do not
get the kind of representation they need... [because the lawyers representing them] are
poorly paid, poorly trained, and are often involved because they need the income to make
ends meet or to gain courtroom experience." DISCARDED CHnDREN, supra note 3, at 55.
Improving the quality of the lawyers appointed to represent children in all legal proceed-
ings, not just child-initiated termination hearings, should be a primary goal for child advo-
cates. See generally Davidson, supra note 381, at 262 (mentioning existing guidelines for
attorneys).
403 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
404 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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sented by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 40 5 The Court
restricted application of its holding to adjudicatory proceedings in
which "the consequence [for the juvenile is] that he may be committed
to a state institution."406 By contrast, the Smith Court found that the
provision of advocates for foster children in adjudicatory hearings
would impose "a major administrative burden on the state [that]
would be balanced by little gain in accuracy of decisionmaking."40 7
Additionally, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,40 8 the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires courts to
appoint counsel for indigent parents faced with a termination hearing
only in exceptional circumstances. 40 9 The Court indicated that as a
general rule "there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of
at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty. '410 The Court
stated, however, that this presumption may be overcome if the parents
demonstrate that their interest, when combined with the risk of error,
is sufficient to outweigh the state's interest in " 'informality, flexibility,
and economy.' ,411 Thus, the Court refused to grant an absolute right
to counsel for indigent parents faced with termination proceedings,
405 The Court required that the "child and his parents... [receive notification) of the
child's right" to retain private counsel or, if they were unable to afford counsel, to obtain a
court appointed attorney. Id. at 41.
406 Id. at 13. The Court stated:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provi-
sions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We
do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile delinquents.
For example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitu-
tional rights applicable to the prejudicial stages of the juvenile process, nor
do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process.
We consider only the problems presented to us by this case.
Id.
407 431 U.S. at 852 n.59.
408 452 U.S. 18 (1981). In this case, the lower court deemed petitioner's infant son a
neglected child and placed him in custody of a state agency in 1975. Id. at 20. A year later
the petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and she began serving a 25-40 year
prison term. Id. In 1978 a termination proceeding was instituted and petitioner was
brought from prison to attend. Id. Finding that she had been given ample time to obtain
counsel and that because her failure to do so was without just cause, the court did not
postpone the proceeding. Id. at 22. Additionally, because petitioner did not claim indi-
gency, the court did not appoint counsel for her. Id. During the hearing, petitioner and
her mother responded to questions by the court, and petitioner cross-examined a social
worker. Id. at 23. The court terminated petitioner's parental rights, finding that she had
"wilfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for the welfare of the minor." Id. at
24. On appeal, petitioner claimed she had been denied due process because the court
failed to appoint counsel for her. Id.
409 Id. at 32.
410 Id. at 31.
411 Id. at 31-32 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 788 (1973)). Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) establishes that three factors must be considered in deter-
mining the "specific dictates of due process" in any given situation. Id. These factors are:
"the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used"; and "the Government's inter-
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although it left open the possibility that court-appointed counsel
might be necessary in a particular case.
In light of Lassiter, foster children seeking to establish the right to
counsel in termination proceedings should employ arguments that fo-
cus on the following factors: (1) children have a strong interest in
their representation in matters which often contemplate extremely se-
rious consequences; (2) there is a high risk of error that without in-
dependent representation, the children's interests will not be
effectively demonstrated in an adversarial process that may involve
conflicting parental interests; and (3) the state interests are relatively
weak. Although these arguments have not yet been tested in federal
court, they may prove successful.
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Additionally, foster children initiating claims in federal court4 12
may be affected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), which pro-
vides that:
whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative,
such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like
fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the in-
fant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who
does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next
friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise rep-
resented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.413
Under Rule 17(c), federal law controls the appointment of a repre-
sentative for a minor or incompetent person,414 even though Rule
17(b) provides that state law determines the capacity of a representa-
tive to sue or be sued.415 In Blackwell v. Vance Trucking,416 the district
court observed that the language of Rule 17(c), which provides that
an infant may sue through a next friend or guardian ad litem, "seems
to abolish the traditional distinction"417 between the treatment of
plaintiffs and defendants. A federal district court may thus appoint a
guardian ad litem not only for an incompetent defendant, but also for
an incompetent plalntiff.41 8
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id.
412 Such as an AACWA claim. See supra part III.B.
413 FED. R_ Cv. P. 17(c).
414 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bengtson, 231 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1953).
415 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
416 139 F. Supp. 103 (D. S.C. 1956).
417 Id. at 106.
418 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b); see also Blackwel, 139 F. Supp. at 103 (noting that Rule
17(c) abolishes that rule and allows a guardian to be appointed for an infant plaintiff,
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Rule 17(c) makes the appointment of a guardian ad litem
mandatory41 9 only when the infant's interests are not already ade-
quately represented and protected. 420 Thus, in Westcott v. United
States421 the court of appeals refused to reverse a case based on the
failure of the trial court to grant a motion for a guardian ad litem for
a minor defendant. The Westcott court concluded that an able attor-
ney had been employed to represent the minor and noted that no
suggestion was made that a guardian ad litem be appointed until the
day of the trial.42 2 When courts do find that a child's interests are in
need of representation and protection, however, the failure to ap-
point a guardian may constitute reversible error.423
Thus, foster children suing in federal court can assert a right to
counsel by arguing under Rule 17(c) that their interests require the
protection and representation of counsel. Such arguments have not
yet been tested in federal court.
B. The Right to Counsel Under State Law
As the Supreme Court recognized in Lassiter, even when the Due
Process Clause does not require the appointment of independent
counsel for minors, "wise public policy ... may ... [still] require that
higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under
the Constitution."424 Toward this end, all states have enacted statutes
that require courts to appoint a legal representative or guardian ad
litem in termination proceedings, or at the very least, to allow the
judge to appoint a guardian ad litem at her discretion. 425
State statutes providing children and their parents with the right
to representation vary greatly in their specificity and language. 426 In
although traditionally a court should appoint a guardian ad litem only to an infant who was
a party defendant).
419 Westcott v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 158 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1946).
420 Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
421 158 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1946).
422 Id. at 21-22.
423 See, e.g., Gardner v. Parsons, 874 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1989) (guardian ad litem should
have been appointed for mentally retarded minor in federal civil rights action challenging
the quality of state-provided care); Shearer v. Coats, 434 N.W.2d 596 (S.D. 1989) (holding
that defendant minor in state court action may not have default judgment entered against
him unless court appointed guardian represents him and appears in the case).
424 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
425 See Davidson, supra note 381, at 268.
426 Many state codes, such as Pennsylvania's, provide for representation at all proceed-
ing stages for a child and her parents, custodian or guardian. When no limitation appears,
as in the Pennsylvania statute, the right to counsel seemingly extends beyond "delin-
quency" matters, to cases of abuse and neglect or noncriminal misbehavior. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6337 (1982). In the Wyoming case of In re Child X, for example, the termina-
tion of parental rights was overturned when counsel was not appointed for a child, as was
statutorily mandated. 617 P.2d 1078 (Wyo. 1980). The Illinois enactment typifies a second
group of statutes which simply entitle all juveniles to the right to counsel without specifying
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Oklahoma, for example, appointing children their own counsel in ter-
mination proceedings is required upon a finding that it is necessary to
protect the interests of the child. In the Oklahoma Supreme Court
case of In re T.M.H., the court interpreted this statute to require sepa-
rate counsel for all children involved in all future termination cases.427
The court reasoned that in termination proceedings the child is
"caught in the middle" and as a result, "the rights and... interests of
children are frequentlyjeopardized... because the best interests of a
child are determined without resort to an independent advocate for
the child."428 Furthermore, the court noted that social service agen-
cies do not always adequately protect the child's interests, especially
when the social service agency is the party being challenged. 429 The
TMH court's interpretation of the statute seems to incorporate the
three-prong balancing test discussed by the Supreme Court in Lassiter.
The TMH court concluded that the balance will forever remain in
favor of the child's right to counsel. This approach presents another
option for state courts seeking to establish such a right.
When statutes fail to state that the right to counsel in termination
proceedings exists, the courts are generally unwilling to recognize the
right independently. For example, in 1976 the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals held that children are not entitled to counsel in every juvenile
court proceeding to terminate parental rights.430 Two years earlier,
the court had recognized the importance of representation in such
hearings, which, the court noted, often involve "potential for conflict
between the interests of the children.., and, of both the state and the
parents."43' Thus, the court retreated from its recognition of the sig-
nificance of termination proceedings, holding that right-to-counsel is-
sues should be decided on a case-by-case basis.432
whether this right extends to all stages of the proceeding or to non-delinquency cases. IL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 705, par. 405/1-5 (Smith-Hurd 1992). In contrast, a third cluster of states
have enacted statutes which suggest a more limited right to counsel. For example, in Ne-
vada, the statute appears broad in application, but is actually quite narrow in that it leaves
the question of appointment of counsel in individual cases to the discretion of the court.
See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT., FRsT JUDIcriAL Dismr CT. RuLEs, RuLE 23 (1994). A fourth
group of state statutes, exemplified by the Virginia code, explicitly state that the right to
counsel applies in noncriminal misbehavior, neglect and dependency cases, as well as "de-
linquency" matters. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 16.1-266 (1988).
427 In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1980).
428 Id. at 470.
429 Id.
430 In re D., 547 P.2d 175, 181 (Or. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
Similarly, in 1976 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that although children have a
statutory right to counsel injuvenile dependency proceeding, they do not have a statutory
or constitutional right to counsel in adoption proceeding. In re Kapcsos, 360 A.2d 174, 178
(Pa. 1976).
431 In re Wade, 527 P.2d 753, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
432 In re D., 547 P.2d at 181.
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Thus, although many states have provided for a right to counsel
for children involved in state-initiated termination proceedings,
courts and legislatures should be urged to require court-appointed
representation for foster children who choose to initiate termination
of parental rights proceedings. In conjunction with their efforts to
establish the right to standing, child advocates must lobby state legisla-
tures to enact statutes specifically guaranteeing the right to counsel in
such proceedings.
CONCLUSION
To rectify the growing limbo problem plaguing foster children
like Gregory Kingsley, all foster children should be given the opportu-
nity to initiate parental rights termination. Granting foster children
the right to initiate parental rights termination proceedings and pro-
viding them with court-appointed attorneys to aid in their efforts
would pave the way for the legal system to address their problems. If
given a voice that is guaranteed to be heard by those responsible for
making the decisions that so dramatically affect their lives, foster chil-
dren will finally have the opportunity to obtain permanent and
healthy homes. Child advocates should actively seek to establish these
rights under federal and state constitutions and statutes. Only once
such rights are recognized and appropriate guidance is given to those
who participate in termination proceedings, will foster children have
an effective tool to help extract themselves from the quagmire of fos-
ter care.
Christina Dugger Sommer
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